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BETWEEN BRAIN AND STATE: HERBERT 
C. HOOVER, GEORGE W. WICKERSHAM, 
AND THE COMMISSION THAT 
GROUNDED SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC 
INVESTIGATIONS OF AMERICAN CRIME 
AND JUSTICE, 1929–1931 AND BEYOND 
JAMES D. CALDER* 
The National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, 
more popularly known as the Wickersham Commission, was embedded 
in President Herbert C. Hoover’s broader policy initiative to improve the 
federal criminal justice system.  Hoover also believed that the results 
would provide state and local governments with models for upgrading all 
other justice systems.  President Hoover instructed the chairman, former 
U.S. Attorney General George W. Wickersham, to assemble a group of 
leading scholars and the best research findings, mainly from the nascent 
social sciences, to investigate the causes and costs of crime, Prohibition 
enforcement, policing, courts and antiquated criminal procedures, and 
prisons, parole and probation practices, among other topics.  Prohibition, 
it is argued, was not the central focus of the Hoover–Wickersham efforts.  
Through the morass of divisive and festering Prohibition controversies, 
however, Hoover and the Wickersham group stayed the course to 
complete the project in 1931.  Ultimately, the Commission’s fourteen 
reports languished in relative obscurity through years of the Depression, 
World War II, and the postwar economic boom.  They served as a 
collective summary of the first federal initiative to examine one of 
America’s most costly social problems.  As time passed, they were cited as 
foundational guideposts in several later federal and state studies, policy 
 
* Professor, Department of Political Science and Geography, The University of Texas at 
San Antonio.  I wish to thank the panel discussant, Professor Emeritus John M. Cooper, Jr., 
for his constructive remarks. 
 
AUTHOR’S NOTE: This article includes material from a chapter in the author’s earlier 
book, THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL CRIME CONTROL POLICY: HERBERT 
HOOVER’S INITIATIVES (1993).  The context of this Article is more narrowly focused on only 
one aspect of Hoover’s policies on crime.  It reflects a recasting of the discussion of the 
Wickersham Commission in light of later crime commission investigations. 
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initiatives, and agency changes.  Recognizing contributions and 
disappointments in the Commission’s work, the net product set the tone 
for future studies of the American justice system while it provided the 
President and the nation with a tool for closing the gap between “brain” 
and “state.” 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
All new Presidents are apprehensive about information needs and 
what they will require during their presidency to craft and implement 
policies.  Quietly, and sometimes reluctantly, Presidents develop as self-
learners while simultaneously serving as public educators.  Presidents 
consume vast quantities of information and they apply the essence with 
relative competence as they learn about and define the road ahead.  
Information, indeed, is the core commodity for transforming public 
expectations and policy ideas into objectives.  Necessarily all received 
information must be reliable and timely, and Presidents must reach 
levels of confidence about these requirements by consulting with a wide 
range of sources.  Presidential scholar Thomas E. Cronin once argued 
that broad consultation serves to narrow what he described as “the 
separation of brain and state.”1  Chief executives appoint policy-skilled 
cabinet heads, they meet frequently with experienced and trusted 
personal advisers, and they read and reflect extensively.  Large-scale 
challenges sometimes call for committees or commissions to gather and 
analyze information in the hands of special subject-matter experts.  
Congressional supporters and detractors are sized up for what they 
know, what they support, and what they can contribute.2  Close personal 
and political friends round out the knowledge trust. 
All this was no less true in 1929 when Herbert Clark Hoover was 
handed the reins of executive power from Calvin Coolidge.3  In this 
article, I apply Cronin’s concept to Hoover’s appointment of the 
 
1. Thomas E. Cronin, On the Separation of Brain and State: Implications for the 
Presidency, in MODERN PRESIDENTS AND THE PRESIDENCY 51, 52 (Marc Landy ed., 1985).  
In essence, the reference is to the activities and decisions of presidents that transform them 
from informed candidates to sophisticated policy makers.  Id. at 51–53. 
2. See generally ROBERT A. CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON: THE PASSAGE 
OF POWER (2012).  Caro praises Lyndon Johnson’s skill in mining information from all of 
these sources during his first rather difficult days in office to his resignation in 1968.  See id. at 
xv–xvii.  Johnson demonstrated a particular skill in mastering a wide range of information 
resources, thus permitting him to reach closure on dozens of domestic policy matters.  Id.  
Much like Hoover, Johnson faced burdensome challenges as President that required him, not 
always successfully, to defend policies built on the acquisition and digestion of massive 
amounts of information.  Id.  See generally Cronin, supra note 1, at 52–53 (explaining that 
presidents and their staffs have to “embark upon major learning undertakings” for 
unexpected and complex issues). 
3. President Calvin Coolidge was perhaps the presidential model most opposite so many 
of his predecessors, seemingly uninterested in the presidency, in learning too much, or in 
engaging in a full measure of public policy concerns in his time.  See WILLIAM. K. 
KLINGAMAN, 1929: THE YEAR OF THE GREAT CRASH 7–8 (1989) (giving a brief glimpse into 
the dour nature of the man purported to have an “astute political mind”). 
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National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, also 
known as the Wickersham Commission, to investigate crime and the 
conditions of federal, state, and local justice systems in the United 
States.4  I discuss the scope, depth, and relative quality of the 
Wickersham Commission and its contributions to Hoover’s ultimate 
objective—the education of a nation then challenged by a persistently 
rising crime problem and relatively weak systems for addressing it.  First 
steps toward meeting this objective were to lay bare certain defective, 
obsolete, and plainly inadequate operations of federal, state, and local 
systems and to set out practical remedies for reducing inefficiencies 
while improving the overall quality of justice administration.  His 
actions constituted, I argue, one of the most important milestones in 
twentieth-century domestic policymaking.  I do not argue, however, that 
Hoover’s work on crime-control policy fully achieved its intended 
objectives, or that the Commission’s reports about conditions were 
given the attention they deserved at the time.  Hoover’s contributions 
resided mainly in a firm commitment to convince the public that the 
very best information about conditions of rampant crime and poor-
quality justice administration could be assembled in a coherent 
explanation of serious problems and best practices for improving 
policing, courts and judicial procedures, and places of incarceration.  In 
doing so, Hoover also expressed his belief that the quality of justice 
delivery was intimately linked to the quality of American life.  In this 
respect, Hoover’s inaugural address spoke volumes about his 
expectations and his priorities: “To consider these evils,” he said, “to 
find their remedy, is the most sore necessity of our times.”5  Hoover was 
the first President to formally address these matters.  The standing these 
matters held among so many other competing priorities was revealed by 
their leading position in his speech, which was broadcast by radio both 
around the country and around the world,6 and delivered in person 
 
4. This article incorporates and relies upon records of the National Commission on Law 
Observance and Enforcement located at the National Archives and Records Administration 
in Washington, D.C.  Where possible, I have included record group and box number 
information as recorded in my research notes and from copies of letters and other documents 
in my personal collection. 
5. President Herbert C. Hoover, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1929). 
6. Although President Calvin Coolidge’s 1925 inauguration was the first to be broadcast 
by radio, Hoover’s 1929 inauguration was the first to be recorded on talking newsreel.  
See   Inaugural   History,   CBS   NEWS,   http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/politics/inauguration
/history.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2013).  The address was broadcast to listeners in, among other 
places, Tokyo, Leningrad, and even Antarctica. 
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before a cold and wet throng of 50,000 spectators on March 4, 1929. 
Contextually, Hoover’s presidency (1929–1933) marked two 
important transitions in American history, each one contributing to his 
legacy certain highs of policy successes and the inevitable lows of unmet 
objectives.  In each case, as with all modern presidencies, blame for 
failures carried over into post-presidential retrospectives whether or not 
different actions or inactions could have changed outcomes.  First, 
Hoover took office in an atmosphere of prosperity and good feeling, but 
his administration ended tragically in a climate of economic doom and 
emotional despair.  Hoover, of course, did not cause the Great 
Depression, but he was not entirely blameless in its management.7  More 
than the experience of any previous economic downturn, American 
economic faith had been permanently altered.  Second, while Hoover’s 
support for continuing Prohibition seemed eminently sensible in 1928, 
by 1932 it had become an unshakeable albatross—indeed, an irritable 
beehive of controversy.  In the midst of economic crisis and thirteen 
years of endless debates about alcohol manufacturing and consumption, 
the increasingly intrusive concerns for crime causation and control, and 
the governmental systems intended to address them, demanded broad 
and systematic investigation.  Never again would American social policy 
discourse ignore the implications of government’s role in attempting to 
control private morality. 
Admittedly, in the nearly 140 years after passage of the Judiciary 
Act of 1789,8 and during the 60 years after the Justice Department was 
created in 1870, the malaise of Prohibition brought new political 
alignments and created new incentives to study the larger concerns for 
crime and justice in American society.  Hoover focused on clarifying the 
extent to which complex federal, state, and local justice systems had 
languished without direction for several decades and thereby had fallen 
into corruption and inefficiencies at odds with the basic ideals of 
American life.  He was simply unwilling to further ignore these 
deteriorated conditions, partly but not wholly driven by a Prohibition 
 
7. An endless number of excellent books have been published on the Great Depression, 
including discussions of Hoover’s philosophical and policy positions.  See generally THE 
DEFINING MOMENT: THE GREAT DEPRESSION AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY IN THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY (Michael D. Bordo et al. eds., 1998); ROBERT S. MCELVAINE, THE 
GREAT DEPRESSION: AMERICA, 1929–1941, at xiii–xiv (1984); AMITY SHLAES, THE 
FORGOTTEN MAN: A NEW HISTORY OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION 3–4 (2007); GENE SMITH, 
THE SHATTERED DREAM: HERBERT HOOVER AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION (1970). 
8. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. 
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policy that had pushed the government’s responses toward widespread 
public scandal.  How, Hoover asked with a much broader concern in 
mind, could the public respect the law when the conditions of its 
administration were so antiquated, inefficient, physically deplorable, 
untrustworthy, and intermittently unjust?  Leaving aside the many 
factors that led to the creation of the Eighteenth Amendment and to the 
Volstead Act,9 the newly elected President Hoover forthrightly declared 
that the most important issues at stake centered on a better system of 
American justice.  He was willing to put the matter squarely on the 
political table and to publicize the findings when the Wickersham 
Commission completed its work. 
Space limitations require that I sidestep extensive discussion of 
Prohibition in relationship to Hoover’s appointment of, and the 
achievements of, the Wickersham Commission.10  Some historians and 
political scientists have tended to regard these two matters as an 
inherently matched pair, in essence a view that Hoover’s interest in the 
Commission was limited to finding ways out from under the Prohibition 
problem.  A close reading of Hoover’s pre-presidential life, however, 
reveals significant evidence in the opposite direction.  Hoover possessed 
an exceptionally thoughtful mind given to ideas about the individual in 
American democracy, humanitarian principles, the role of government 
in improving the quality of American life, the value of scientific 
evidence in public-policy formation, and efficiency in the delivery of 
justice.  True, Prohibition had not escaped Hoover’s thinking in 1928 
and he did not avoid its quandaries as he tasked the Wickersham 
Commission’s commencement during his first days in office.  Had 
Hoover insisted on allowing Prohibition to drive all (or even the 
majority) of his perspectives on crime control and justice administration, 
however, and if he had permitted mental absorption of the endless 
political and social carping about the alcohol issue, he could easily have 
organized a commission to defend a corresponding policy.  Factually, 
the issue was rife with obvious political disincentives that commanded 
 
9. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII; National Prohibition Act, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305 (1919). 
10. The scholarly and popular literatures on Prohibition are extensive and thus too 
numerous to cite with any fair degree of inclusiveness.  See, e.g., DAVID E. KYVIG, 
REPEALING NATIONAL PROHIBITION (2000); DANIEL OKRENT, LAST CALL: THE RISE AND 
FALL OF PROHIBITION (2010); ANDREW SINCLAIR, PROHIBITION: THE ERA OF EXCESS 
(1962); LAWRENCE SPINELLI, DRY DIPLOMACY: THE UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN, 
AND PROHIBITION (2008). 
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respect from both presidential candidates.11  Practically speaking, as 
later economic events would establish, Prohibition was becoming a 
political nightmare and a popular-interest loser. 
Considering the matter with a long-term view, there is plenty of 
evidence that in the years before World War I Hoover enjoyed daily 
cocktails, had consumed high-quality wines, and had even taken the 
occasional drink in private settings during and following his presidency.  
Clearly, Hoover was no prude on the subject of alcoholic beverages, nor 
did his public views on alcohol deliver him into the political hands of 
ardent prohibitionists.  He was well-versed in the details, positions, and 
personalities on both sides of Prohibition, and he was wise enough to 
avoid capture by one camp or the other.  By 1928 his support for 
Prohibition was compartmented in several different sectors of his 
reasoning, some of which may have appeared contradictory and floating 
around in what David Burner characterized as “a neat and undoubtedly 
sincere straddle.”12  On one hand, he held firm to strictures related to 
amending the Constitution.  After all, thirty-six states had ratified the 
Eighteenth Amendment by which a social control mechanism had been 
imposed.  A strong popular belief had evolved that the long and storied 
history of widespread toleration of alcohol consumption necessitated the 
imposition of a national law.  The Congress and the states, Hoover 
believed, were therefore obligated to take up the matter if they chose to 
do so.  Unquestionably this perspective appeared to have directly 
challenged his views on individualism and the need to restrain 
governmental actions in the lives of private citizens.  On the other hand, 
he was deeply concerned about popular nullification of the law as 
expressed by a sizeable number of people, including the criminal 
element, who flaunted alcohol consumption and who were not 
interested in constitutional justifications.  Perhaps Hoover assumed that 
 
11. During the 1928 presidential campaign, candidate Herbert Hoover “committed 
himself” to supporting Prohibition.  See RICHARD NORTON SMITH, AN UNCOMMON MAN: 
THE TRIUMPH OF HERBERT HOOVER 32, 105 (1984).  In the course of winning the ultimate 
objective, he recognized that he had little room to maneuver politically.  See KLINGAMAN, 
supra note 3, at 16, 20–30.  In this author’s view, he was sincere in maintaining his position to 
uphold the Constitution’s Eighteenth Amendment, a necessary approach in order to clearly 
distinguish his candidacy from his anti-Prohibition opponent, Democrat candidate Al Smith.  
There was little question about Smith’s views in support of repealing Prohibition.  Neither 
candidate wanted to address the issue head on, particularly because they both realized that 
some members of the press would continue to raise caustic issues such as the mix of religion 
with Prohibition opposition or support.  In the end, Hoover won election in a landslide.  See 
infra note 38 and accompanying text. 
12. DAVID BURNER, HERBERT HOOVER: A PUBLIC LIFE 203 (1978). 
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the people who favored Prohibition, as well as opponents who refused 
to relinquish America’s alcohol-soaked heritage, would patiently await 
resolution through enlightened acceptance of the political will. 
Contradictions and straddling aside, Hoover’s interest in the 
continuation of Prohibition likely sprang from his sincerely held 
functional perspectives on family life and the circumstances of work 
environments.  For many decades alcohol had imposed significant 
damage on families and individuals and its excesses had impacted 
worker productivity and safety in the new industrial age.  It was in these 
areas that Hoover’s political pragmatism could find a balance and a 
sanctuary from criticism.13  Frankly, an explanation may have resided at 
an even more basic level.  In his private moments, Hoover may easily 
have agreed with Walter Lippmann’s blunt commentary regarding the 
“wets” and “drys,” that is, that both parties were “substantially 
insane.”14  In my view, therefore, Hoover had every reason to regard 
Prohibition as a noisy background issue that required some measure of 
attention by the Wickersham Commission.  Prohibition, however, was 
not an issue Hoover permitted to hijack his objective of closing the 
separation between brain and state concerning the significantly larger 
matter of American justice administration.  Ultimately he wanted a 
body of knowledge that would address the methods and parameters of 
antiquated practices in policing, prosecuting, and imprisoning law 
violators made worse by, but not limited to, the excesses of Prohibition. 
II. HOOVER’S BACKGROUND AND INTERESTS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
MATTERS 
Hoover named many fact-finding bodies like the Wickersham 
Commission, as did the Congress.15  Later in his administration, Hoover 
was sometimes criticized for having done so, thus providing his 
opponents ammunition they needed during a deepening economic crisis.  
But Presidents before Hoover frequently used study commissions to 
enrich personal knowledge and to educate the public on the 
complexities of important policy matters, and the Congress had its own 
 
13. Id. at 107.  Hoover had shown himself to be a political pragmatist on the issue of 
Prohibition several times in earlier years dating back to World War I.  Id. 
14. OKRENT, supra note 10, at 304. 
15. Presidents from Theodore Roosevelt through Herbert Hoover had named 139 
committees or commissions, while in the same period the Congress named 171 such bodies.  
White House Statement on Committees and Commissions, 1932–33 PUB. PAPERS 173, 173 
(Apr. 24, 1932). 
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rich history of naming special commissions and committees.  Pre-
Hoover Presidents such as Roosevelt, Taft, Wilson, Harding, and 
Coolidge and their respective congressional peers had named 
approximately 482 such groups.16  None of these groups, however, was 
charged with comprehensive investigations of the causes of rising crime 
or the interplay of justice system components across the spectrum of 
topics from crime prevention and policing to punitive sanctions and 
rehabilitation.  Calvin Coolidge’s National Crime Commission (1925–
1929), for example, was ill-conceived and produced nothing of 
consequence.  Its membership was a collection of inexperienced elites, 
and it lacked a methodology for mining information.  Its findings were 
singularly vapid.17 
Hoover’s approach to fact-finding and policy options about crime 
and justice was cutting edge for its time.  He believed that by calling 
upon leading experts in the relatively new social and behavioral sciences 
he could draw together some consensus about major problems and 
viable solutions.  His faith was not unfounded, however, as evidenced by 
the willingness of leading practitioners and scholars to embrace his 
initiative.  Unlike Coolidge, Hoover wanted the top people to explore, 
summarize, and present all aspects of then-current crime and justice 
studies.  He expected that improvements in justice system processes 
would benefit from a publicly-funded inquiry.  In essence, he was 
confident that government could produce the kind of science-based 
findings that could positively impact the crime problem and improve the 
quality of justice organizations and practices.  Hoover knew, of course, 
that discussions about American justice systems could not sidestep the 
nettlesome issue of Prohibition enforcement.  Such a maneuver would 
have attracted punishing political criticisms that could easily have 
undermined the more important work, such as detailed examination of 
so many difficult challenges facing law enforcement and law observance 
apart from the alcohol issue.  For decades, incessant yammering about 
the subject made the political middle ground difficult to navigate.  Thus, 
it was necessary for Hoover to carefully choose his words in his 
inaugural address: the trends of rising crime and falling confidence in 
the justice system were “only in part due to the additional burdens 
 
16. Id. 
17. See John H. Wigmore, The National Crime Commission: What Will It Achieve?, 16 J. 
AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 312, 313–15 (1925).  See generally E.R. Cass, National 
Crime Commission Conference, 18 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 497 (1928) 
(providing a summation of this Commission). 
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imposed on our judicial system by the eighteenth amendment.”18 
In 1928 Herbert Hoover was regarded as something of a national 
icon, liked by Democrats and Republicans.  He won the election by a 
landslide, entering office with strongly held ideas about matters of state 
and a limited but affirmative role for government in addressing social 
problems such as crime and justice system administration.  An engineer 
by training and experience, he insisted upon thorough study before 
making critical decisions.  Government policies, he believed, should be 
grounded in scientific findings, thus yielding the maximum in operating 
coherence and agency efficiencies.  Also, he was, as the historian Ellis 
Hawley once observed, a committed believer in the “associative state,” a 
view of governance that argued for economic and social progress based 
on cooperative links between government and private interests through 
methods of science and efficient productivity.19  Hoover, like other 
adherents to principles of scientific management,20 held great faith in the 
discovery of facts through subject-matter consultations with experts, 
formal investigations, and commissions and committees. 
Creation of the Wickersham Commission clearly demonstrated 
Hoover’s principal drive to instruct the nation on prospective reforms to 
the then-current justice system practices and to do so through 
publication of investigations and results bearing the stamp of scientific 
credibility.  And the experts he chose for the work were faced with 
difficult challenges.  In 1929 American criminal justice at any level was 
easily characterized as a toxic mix of arrogance of power, incompetence, 
corruption, procedural obsolescence, rampant civil-liberties abuses, 
marginal preparation, and secretive and sometimes brutal conduct.  
 
18. Hoover, supra note 5. 
19. Ellis W. Hawley, Herbert Hoover, the Commerce Secretariat, and the Vision of an 
“Associative State,” 1921–1928, 61 J. AM. HIST. 116, 116–19 (1974–1975). 
20. Scientific management can be generally described as organization and management 
methods for improving mainly manufacturing productivity.  See ROBERT KANIGEL, THE ONE 
BEST WAY: FREDERICK WINSLOW TAYLOR AND THE ENIGMA OF EFFICIENCY 6–7 (1997).  
It took root in the late nineteenth century largely through the theoretical and applied 
foundations of Frederick Winslow Taylor.  Id.  In revolutionary fashion, Taylor’s principles 
were adopted widely by industrial leaders and government agencies and held prominence for 
several decades thereafter.  Id. at 7.  Volumes too numerous to cite have been written about 
these principles.  Taylor’s life and work are excellently narrated in Kanigel’s, The One Best 
Way: Frederick Winslow Taylor and the Enigma of Efficiency.  See generally id.; Charles 
Walcott & Karen M. Hult, Management Science and the Great Engineer: Governing the White 
House During the Hoover Administration, 20 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 557 (1990) (providing 
a window into Hoover’s managerial approach as applied to his White House staffing 
structure). 
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Many of the largest police and court systems were controlled by the 
heavy hands of ward bosses, gangsters, and the unchallenged power of 
administrators ranging from police chiefs to prison wardens.  
Prosecutorial functions suffered with impossible caseloads, corrupt 
practices, complicated or nonexistent rules, and low-grade lawyering.  
City and county jails were often cesspools of brutality and inhumane 
conditions.  State prisons were frequently harsh places in which 
overcrowded conditions led to public health crises and riots.  And 
parole and probation practices remained thwarted and underutilized 
options as alternatives to incarceration.  Hoover, a Quaker by religious 
roots, had learned a great deal about such conditions through life 
experiences and associations with many experts, and he recognized over 
time that although a President lacked sufficient powers to change state 
and local justice conditions, he could expose some of the worst aspects 
by public investigation.  He could also offer affirmative 
recommendations that were consistent with his strong faith in the 
federalist system of American government.  He never argued that the 
Wickersham Commission was the perfect solution, nor did he claim it 
was the only solution.  Surely in his post-presidential years21 he must 
have reflected on the pathway he opened for an even broader national 
discussion about crime and justice. 
Motivations to reform criminal justice conditions evolved from 
Hoover’s early years as a developing entrepreneur and organization 
leader.  These motivations advanced later when Hoover served as a 
federal administrator, and they reached full consideration during his run 
for the presidency.  Born in 1874 and raised in central Iowa and Oregon, 
Hoover’s early life included the hardships of being an orphan and a 
wrenching but supportive resettlement in his youth.  Hoover never 
attended high school, but he completed a college degree in geology at 
Stanford University.  Hoover’s mining career advanced rapidly in 
Australia and later in China, where he ran headlong into entrenched 
elements of corruption that, although not amenable to permanent 
change, caused him to improve his business accounting and operational 
practices.  Within his own mining company, Hoover discovered 
fraudulent transactions attributable to a business partner’s handling of 
company securities, thus sharpening his awareness of unethical and 
illegal business operators.  The historian George H. Nash eloquently 
 
21. Hoover died at the age of 90 in 1964, and he is buried at the Hoover Presidential 
Library in West Branch, Iowa.  See SMITH, supra note 7, at 239.  
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describes the events in Hoover’s experiences up to 1917.22  Hoover’s 
early interests in justice administration appeared with increasing 
frequency between 1914 and 1928.  As mining successes expanded, 
others, such as business colleagues, diplomats, and journalists, 
recognized certain organization and management skills that found use in 
World War I.  In quick order, Hoover emerged as an internationally 
recognized hero in refugee resettlement during the Belgium food relief 
effort.23  Here again, Hoover confronted the problem of corruption in 
fraudulent schemes that diverted food from friendly to enemy hands.  
Hoover was irate and his anger caused him to reorganize the 
distribution system and impose rigorous controls.  Not by choice, the 
food relief experience elevated his political profile after World War I, 
and soon his name was placed in nomination in the Republican 
presidential convention of 1920.  President Warren G. Harding named 
him Secretary of Commerce in 1921, and Calvin Coolidge retained him 
when Harding died in 1923. 
Throughout his Commerce years, Hoover stood firmly against 
cartels created to fix prices.24  He was heard to proclaim in 1924, “When 
legislation penetrates the business world it is because there is abuse 
somewhere. . . .  In the main . . . the public acts only when it has lost 
confidence in the ability or willingness of business to correct its own 
abuses.”25  The Teapot Dome oil reserves scandal in 1923–1924 honed 
public understanding of such abuses of trust.  Hoover was so disgusted 
with the whole mess that he contemplated resignation from the 
Cabinet.26  In addition to organizing study commissions to bring business 
and government closer on matters of international trade, he organized 
special enterprise groups interested in new innovations and related 
regulatory problems, such as regulation of the airwaves.  These ventures 
led, in the case of the new police radio bands, to innovations and 
regulatory conventions for the rapidly expanding radio industry.  
Meetings and visits led to associations with innovative and respected 
police chiefs, such as the eminent Chief August Vollmer of Berkeley, 
 
22. See generally GEORGE H. NASH, THE LIFE OF HERBERT HOOVER: THE 
HUMANITARIAN, 1914–1917 (1988). 
23. Id. at 34–36.  Nash’s full chapter, “Who’s Hoover?,” captures the full context of 
Hoover’s evolution from efficient engineer to widely recognized leader.  Id. 
24. BURNER, supra note 12, at 173. 
25. HERBERT C. HOOVER, THE MEMOIRS OF HERBERT HOOVER: THE CABINET AND 
THE PRESIDENCY, 1920–1933, at 171 (1952). 
26. SMITH, supra note 11, at 102. 
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California; New York City Police Commissioner Arthur H. Woods; 
Detroit Police Commissioner William Rutledge; attorney and author of 
police histories Raymond B. Fosdick; and police consultant Bruce Smith 
and others. 
III. ADDITIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE ASSOCIATIONS 
Hoover expanded associations with other elements of justice 
administration after 1920.  Additional police contacts included the 
director of the Bureau of Investigation, John Edgar Hoover (no relation 
to then-Secretary Hoover).  The Bureau had experienced significant 
scandal in its first fifteen years of operation and in 1924 it desperately 
needed a new director.  With Secretary Hoover’s support, J. Edgar 
Hoover was selected to clean up the agency.27  Other associations 
included Lawrence Richey, the former undercover agent for the Secret 
Service during the Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson 
presidencies, and Mabel Walker Willebrandt, the head of the Justice 
Department’s tax, prisons and prohibition enforcement division and the 
highest ranking woman in federal service.28  Legal and judicial 
associations included William J. Donovan, the prominent war hero, New 
York lawyer, and assistant attorney general in the Justice Department’s 
Antitrust Division (and later the chief of the Office of Strategic Services 
in World War II);29 Harlan F. Stone, the former Columbia Law School 
dean and Attorney General; William D. Mitchell, the Solicitor General 
under President Coolidge and an astute legal mind skilled in 
administrative efficiencies; Charles Evans Hughes, the former 
progressive Governor of New York, U.S. Secretary of State, and judge 
on the Court of International Justice; Roscoe Pound, the dean of the 
Harvard Law School; and Felix Frankfurter, the progressive lawyer and 
 
27. Secretary Hoover was asked by Attorney General Harlan F. Stone whether he knew 
“of a good lawyer-administrator to run the Bureau,” and Secretary Hoover recommended J. 
Edgar Hoover.  ATHAN G. THEOHARIS & JOHN STUART COX, THE BOSS: J. EDGAR 
HOOVER AND THE GREAT AMERICAN INQUISITION 83 (1988).  Stone subsequently 
appointed J. Edgar Hoover as director.  Id. at 84.  J. Edgar Hoover and Herbert Hoover 
would become close friends.  Hoover Heads: A Tale of Two Hoovers, HERBERT HOOVER 
PRESIDENTIAL   LIBRARY   &   MUSEUM,   http://hoover.archives.gov/hooverhead/peopleand
places.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2013); see also RICHARD GID POWERS, SECRECY AND 
POWER: THE LIFE OF J. EDGAR HOOVER 143 (1987); SMITH, supra note 11, at 389; 
THEOHARIS & COX, supra, at 83. 
28. See DOROTHY M. BROWN, MABEL WALKER WILLEBRANDT: A STUDY OF POWER, 
LOYALTY, AND LAW (1984) (providing an excellent biography). 
29. DOUGLAS WALLER, WILD BILL DONOVAN: THE SPYMASTER WHO CREATED THE 
OSS AND MODERN AMERICAN ESPIONAGE 38–41, 116 (2011). 
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holder of a distinguished chair in law at Harvard.  Sanford Bates, the 
nationally recognized superintendent of the Massachusetts prison 
system, along with several other officials in the new era of progressive 
corrections, had also come to Hoover’s attention.30 
Many of the people Hoover had met in criminal justice circles were 
offered or became part of his presidential administration: J. Edgar 
Hoover remained director of the Bureau of Investigation; Richey 
became Hoover’s ranking personal secretary (of three in the White 
House);31 Willebrandt (labeled the “generalissimo”) briefly remained 
head of the Justice Department’s Prohibition work;32 Woods served as a 
background adviser on law enforcement matters; Donovan was offered 
but turned down an ambassadorship to the Philippines when Hoover 
reneged, writes historian Douglas Waller, on his promise to appoint 
Donovan as Attorney General;33 Stone was named by Hoover as 
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court; Mitchell became Hoover’s 
Attorney General; Hughes was named Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court; Pound was named as a member of the Wickersham Commission; 
Frankfurter consulted with Pound and the Wickersham Commission and 
joined others in writing the contentious and unpublished Mooney–
Billings report; and Bates served as the first director of the Bureau of 
Prisons until 1936. 
By 1928 these associations had schooled Hoover on a range of 
criminal justice issues.  Popular public discussions included concerns for 
rising and deepening crime problems in American society, including 
stories of rampant “gangsterism” and corruption by public servants.  No 
national statistics were available at the time to measure the seriousness 
of these concerns, however, and public policy was hard-pressed to 
pinpoint which among them required the most immediate attention.  
 
30. In general, progressive corrections practices, including humanitarian methods of 
punishment and rehabilitation, were subjects grounded in values buried in Hoover’s Quaker 
upbringing and which continued to inspire his thinking well after 1920. 
31. Hoover’s three secretaries were Lawrence Richey, his personal secretary and 
gatekeeper for access; George Akerson, his public relations secretary; and French Strother, 
his administrative secretary.  See Herbert Hoover: Domestic Affairs, MILLER CENTER, 
http://millercenter.org/president/hoover/essays/biography/4 (last visited Apr. 9, 2013). 
32. She was on Hoover’s list for possible removal in 1929 because of unfortunate 
remarks she made during the 1928 presidential campaign about Al Smith, Hoover’s 
opponent, linking Smith’s Catholicism with his opposition to the Prohibition made during the 
1928 presidential campaign.  See JAMES D. CALDER, THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF 
FEDERAL CRIME CONTROL POLICY: HERBERT HOOVER’S INITIATIVES 42–43 (1993). 
33. WALLER, supra note 29, at 40–41. 
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“Organized crime” entered the lexicon of news commentators and 
reporters.34  Racketeering appeared to place a stranglehold on many 
urban governments and Hoover developed a particular focus on the 
corrosive aspects of the Al Capone organization in Chicago.35  
Prohibition enforcement, of course, took center stage as the 1928 
presidential campaign neared conclusion.   
Lest we overemphasize Hoover’s ongoing ties to important leaders 
and thinkers in criminal justice, I rush to make clear that he had many 
other policy areas he wished to explore during his administration, and 
he recognized that there were many competent criminal justice experts 
who could carry out the operational work.  Keenly aware of 
Prohibition’s impact on the federal justice system, for example, he 
wanted the experts to identify ways to encourage state and local 
governments to move past their habits of malingering on enforcement 
responsibilities.  The new fields of criminology and public 
administration could be called upon in this area since they had 
published research proclaiming the negative effects of Prohibition on 
city, county, and state agencies.36  There was also a fledgling group of 
criminologists available to give some attention to local- or state-level 
study of justice systems.37  Others held expertise in the problems of the 
federal system, a relatively small patchwork of agencies cobbled 
together to meet the demands of periodic spurts of expansion in the 
previous three decades.  America in 1929, Hoover knew, remained a 
nation operating on a shoestring criminal-justice budget, but he also 
believed that the experts could offer recommendations that would move 
 
34. See, e.g., Chicago Vice Profit Put at $13,500,000, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1928, at 10; 
Philadelphia Judge Opens War on Gangs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1928, at 15. 
35. Herbert Hoover employed the term “organized crime” in his Annual Message to 
Congress on the State of the Union on December 3, 1929.  President Herbert Hoover, Annual 
Message to Congress on the State of the Union (Dec. 3, 1929).  The term appeared 
infrequently in popular usage but it became more common after 1930.  Before then, 
“racketeering” was the more commonly used term of reference.  See, e.g., Blames Public 
Laxity for ‘Racketeering,’ N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1928, at 7; Middle West Drys Stage Bitter Fight, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1928, at 2. 
36. Articles and books abound and can be found via JSTOR and other searches using 
such terms as “Prohibition and Crime” or “Prohibition and Public Administration.”  A few 
interesting articles include: Crime Situation Reviewed by Noted Criminologists, 11 SCI. 
NEWSL. 39, 39–41 (1927); Raymond Moley, Some Tendencies in Criminal Law 
Administration, 42 POL. SCI. Q. 497, 518–23 (1927); Leonard D. White, Public Administration, 
1927, 22 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 339, 342 (1928). 
37. See generally BURDETTE G. LEWIS, THE CLEVELAND FOUND., CORRECTIONAL 
AND PENAL TREATMENT (1921).  
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systems beyond mere muddling along in a condition of grossly obsolete 
institutions and legal procedures.  In simple terms, he understood that 
the escalating strains of Prohibition enforcement had pushed local, state, 
and federal systems over the edge of a high cliff that had been rising 
even higher for many years.  Despite any naturally occurring political 
constituency, it was becoming increasingly obvious that a call for formal 
investigation was a sensible idea with bipartisan political support and 
the help of the very best minds.  National political will and supportively 
inclined political leadership remained, however, the two most important 
ingredients needed to study a myriad of problems and urge ameliorative 
policy responses.  Parts of Hoover’s campaign speeches projected an 
image of enthusiastic willingness primed to forthrightly address the 
issues of law observance and enforcement. 
IV. WICKERSHAM COMMISSION BEGINNINGS 
The election of 1928 resulted in a landslide victory for Hoover.38  His 
inaugural address left no doubt about the significant changes he 
expected for federal justice administration.  Citizen engagement, 
however, was critical to the containment of escalating crime and support 
for law observance and enforcement.  Hoover made no apologies for the 
difficulties he faced in walking a narrow path between supporters and 
political adversaries.  Solutions to the crime problem were discoverable, 
however.39  It was necessary, Hoover argued, to learn more before 
 
38. Hoover received 21.4 million popular votes and 444 electoral votes, while Al Smith 
received 15 million popular votes and 87 electoral votes.  David Liep, 1928 Presidential 
General Election Results, ATLAS OF U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, http://uselectionatlas.or
g/RESULTS/national.php?year=1928 (last visited Apr. 9, 2013).  All but seven states voted 
for Hoover.  Id. 
39. Both Democrats and Republicans were aware of its deleterious effects on rational 
discourse.  Unquestionably Hoover and his opponent, Al Smith, recognized that the 
constitutionally based policy had fully strained the capabilities of all justice system elements.  
Changes were needed but there were no easy solutions.  The problem resided in the law itself 
and the unwillingness of more than half the population to admit to its abject failure as a 
standalone solution to alcohol consumption.  Parts of local, state, and federal systems were 
considered rife with incompetence and insufficient enforcement capacity, and the Treasury 
Department’s Prohibition Bureau was the perfect example of the worst case of government 
performance.  Other federal elements were only marginally functional.  Some part of the 
problem also lay in the low skills or corruption of people heading state agencies while other 
administrative and political entities simply turned a blind eye to the need for modernizing law 
enforcement, judicial, and penal institutions.  Indicators of reform-minded leadership were on 
the horizon, however, due mainly to the slow but persistent advances in police and penal 
administration.  What remained necessary to catalyzing the intellectual roots of change was a 
triggering mechanism, an element that was unlikely to appear unless a national level expose 
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rendering judgments.  Hoover was aware that the experts would face 
difficulties as soon as they applied study results and reasoning to 
complex problems well beyond Prohibition, such as crime conditions, 
causative factors, escalating juvenile delinquency, immigration abuses, 
cumbersome legal procedures, and crowded jails and prisons.  It was 
clear to Hoover that focused attention on these subjects would attract 
controversy from interests vested in continuation of the old ways and 
when specific defects were given national level exposure.  Hoover and 
his teams of experts were not dissuaded by these challenges, however.  
As a counterbalance to the status quo, Hoover’s appointments to the 
fact-finding commission would include mainly respected academics and 
practitioners from the relatively new social and behavioral sciences, 
including criminology, the “realist” movement in American law, 
political science, psychology, public administration, and sociology. 
Recognizing that the Congress guarded its prerogatives in 
overseeing federal organizations and operations, the Wickersham 
Commission was instructed to avoid reorganization proposals that might 
raise eyebrows in congressional committees and in the halls of 
enforcement and judicial functions.  In a press release on March 19, 
1929, Hoover declared, “I am not looking for dramatics.  I am looking 
for substantial, permanent advance of the country to a realization of the 
necessity of enforcing the laws of the United States as they are on the 
books.”40  This was followed on June 6 with a special message to the 
Congress inviting the creation of a congressionally named joint 
committee to examine questions of Prohibition enforcement and 
matters related to reorganization and consolidation of enforcement 
functions, yet another indication of a desire to distinguish this issue from 
the Commission’s mainstream work.41  He proposed that as the 
Commission developed findings it would share them with congressional 
committees.  Unquestionably this proposal was a calculated political 
approach aimed at strengthening the notion of executive–legislative 
cooperation on shares of the results of joint investigations.  The 
Congress, after all, had provided the initial funding of $250,000 for the 
Commission’s work.42 
 
revealed the depths of the situation.  
40. The President’s News Conference, 1929 PUB. PAPERS 30, 32 (Mar. 19, 1929). 
41. Special Message to the Congress Proposing a Study of the Reorganization of 
Prohibition Enforcement Responsibilities, 1929 PUB. PAPERS 178, 178 (June 6, 1929). 
42. House Restores $250,000 for Hoover’s Law Board: Dry Padlock Drive Looms, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 3, 1930, at 1.  Work with the proposed congressional committee was to be headed 
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Chairman Wickersham got to work in spring 1929.43  One writer 
observed Wickersham’s jaunty style and the youthful spring in his step, 
notable because the former Attorney General was seventy-one years 
old: “There is nothing calm nor judgelike in his manner. . . .  While 
younger men wilted under the terrific heat, dressed in a pongee suit and 
a silk shirt, he rushed from one room to another, directing his assistants, 
seeing visitors, joking and keeping everyone in good humor.”44  
Actually, he was Hoover’s third choice for the position after Harlan 
Stone and Charles Evans Hughes had declined.45  Hoover and 
Wickersham dated their relationship to World War I and to meetings 
during Hoover’s Commerce years.  They had shared similar views on the 
value of the Sherman Antitrust Act46 in addressing the concentration of 
monopolistic enterprises.47  Other selections for Commission 
membership developed from Wickersham’s contacts with well-known 
scholars and practitioners across various relevant disciplines.  To get the 
intended useful and far-reaching results, and with full knowledge that 
the scope of the task had no historical precedent at the national level, 
meant Wickersham could not afford any delays. 
Membership commitments were in place on May 20 and the 
Hoover–Wickersham plans for study were set out in the first meeting 
with all eleven commissioners at 2:30 p.m. on May 28, 1929, in the 
temporary Justice Department quarters.  The Commission’s offices were 
not yet completed.48  The President was warm, firm, and direct in setting 
 
by John L. McNab, a prominent San Francisco lawyer.  Statement on the Appointment of 
John McNab to Study and Formulate Plans for the Improvement of Prohibition Law 
Enforcement, 1929 PUB. PAPERS 309, 309–10 (Oct. 1, 1929); John L. M’Nab Dies; Coast 
Lawyer, 77, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1956, at 92. 
43. David J. Hanson, Wickersham Commission, ALCOHOL: PROBLEMS & SOLUTIONS, 
http://www2.potsdam.edu/hansondj/Controversies/Wickersham-Commission.html (last visited 
Apr. 9, 2013).  Wickersham set aside his lucrative New York law practice and served as the 
Commission chairman without pay.  S. J. Woolf, Wickersham Talks of Life and the Law, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 8, 1929, at 3. 
44. Woolf, supra note 43. 
45. CALDER, supra note 32, at 13–14.  
46. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006). 
47. See James Clifford German, Jr., Taft’s Attorney General: George W. Wickersham 
(Oct. 1969) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New York University). 
48. Eventually the headquarters was moved into the newly constructed Tower Building 
at 14th and K Street in Washington, D.C.  The Wickershambles That Led to the End of 
Prohibition, METRO JACKSONVILLE, Apr. 8, 2010, http://www.metrojacksonville.com/article/
2010-mar-the-wickershambles-that-led-to-the-end-of-prohibition.  The building is now 
considered a landmark for its art deco architectural design and its set-back form, unique 
among tall downtown Washington office buildings.  See National Register of Historic Places 
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forth an expectation of commitment to scientific investigations and to 
meaningful recommendations in all the areas under study.  Hoover’s 
remarks never mentioned Prohibition.  His public statements had 
already clarified the Commission’s purpose.  As expressed in editorial 
columns and letters to newspaper editors, anticipatory press coverage 
yielded high expectations.  Hoover said that he wanted the 
investigations to formulate “constructive, courageous conclusions which 
will bring public understanding and command public support of its 
solutions.”49  Hoover was unwilling to compromise on improvements 
that he expected to be made to justice system practices, including 
reinstatement of the rule of law in civilized American governance 
processes.  “The American people,” Hoover said, 
are deeply concerned over the alarming disobedience of law, the 
abuses in law enforcement and the growth of organized crime, 
which has spread in every field of evil-doing in every part of our 
country.  A nation does not fail from its growth of wealth or 
power.  But no nation can for long survive the failure of its 
citizens to respect and obey the laws which they themselves 
make.  Nor can it survive a decadence of the moral and spiritual 
concepts that are the basis [sic] of respect for law nor from 
neglect to organize itself to defeat crime and the corruption that 
flows from it.  Nor is this a problem confined to the enforcement 
and obedience of one law or the laws of the Federal or State 
Governments separately.  The problem is partly the attitude 
toward all law.50 
Clearly, both the tone and substance of these remarks were far-reaching 
in their scope of appeal. 
Chairman Wickersham and Attorney General William D. Mitchell 
then delivered welcoming remarks.  The Justice Department, Mitchell 
said, was fully supportive of the Commission’s work and would assist in 
any ways it could.51  Hoover, Mitchell, and Wickersham returned to their 
 
Registration Form, Tower Building, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior § 8, at 1 (Aug. 8, 1995), 
available at http://pdfhost.focus.nps.gov/docs/NRHP/Text/95001084.pdf.  At the time it was 
constructed, it was the tallest office building in Washington, D.C.  Id. 
49. Herbert C. Hoover, Remarks at the First Meeting of the National Commission on 
Law Observance and Enforcement (May 28, 1929) (on file at the National Archives and 
Records Administration at RG 10, Box 10). 
50. Id. 
51. Remarks at the First Meeting of the National Commission on Law Observance and 
Enforcement, 1929 PUB. PAPERS 159, 160 (May 28, 1929). 
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offices.  The room full of eager commissioners got down to business.  
Discussion was lively and gave strong indications about the prospects for 
vigorous debate concerning the subject matter of and approaches to the 
research agenda.  Commissioner Paul J. McCormick, a federal district 
judge from the Southern District of California, pushed for priority to be 
assigned to law enforcement criminal procedure, in particular, he felt 
that it was necessary to find ways to speed up the criminal justice 
process and to consider expanding the lower federal courts to add a new 
level that would handle the massive criminal caseload.  “‘The basic evil,’ 
McCormick announced without hesitation, ‘lay in the professional 
criminal lawyers,’ police ‘third degree’ tactics, and ‘marketed 
injustice.’”52  Commissioner Ada L. Comstock, a sociologist and the 
president of Radcliffe College, recommended that the state of mind of 
lawbreakers was worthy of research concerning lawbreakers’ 
perceptions that beating the law was a “meritorious game.”53  
Commissioner Monte M. Lemann, a distinguished New Orleans trial 
lawyer and the president of the Louisiana Bar Association, wondered 
whether Prohibition was at the root of many Americans’ general 
disrespect of the law.  Commissioner Frank J. Loesch, a judge, a citizen 
leader in Chicago’s anti-gangster efforts, the vice president of the 
Chicago Crime Commission, and a notable member of the Chicago Bar 
Association, zeroed in on more specific issues of jury challenges, jury 
instructions, bail practices, and judicial waivers of felony cases to 
misdemeanors.  Judge William S. Kenyon, the former U.S. Senator from 
Iowa and a sitting judge on the Eighth Circuit, said that most criminals 
“of the gangster type bore foreign names,” and that criminal defense 
lawyers were “the greatest obstacle in the way of the administration of 
justice.”54  As a Prohibition supporter, Kenyon insisted upon an 
objective study of the question.  Late in the Commission’s work, 
Kenyon showed some objectivity when he claimed he was “appalled at 
the venom and malice of the people whom we term the ‘wets,’ and . . . 
the stupidity of the ‘ultra drys.’”55  Commissioner William I. Grubb, a 
 
52. CALDER, supra note 32, at 79. 
53. Id. (quoting Ada Comstock). 
54. Id. (quoting William S. Kenyon); Wickersham Commission, Meeting Minutes (May 
28, 1929) (on file at the National Archives and Records Administration at RG 10, Box 1) 
[hereinafter Minutes]. 
55. CALDER, supra note 32, at 79–80 (quoting Letter from William S. Kenyon to George 
W. Wickersham (Mar. 23, 1931) (on file at the National Archives and Records 
Administration at RG 10, Box 16)). 
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federal district judge from the Northern District of Alabama, blamed 
the problem on juries’ unwillingness to convict offenders.  Conversely, 
Commissioner Kenneth R. Mackintosh, a prominent Seattle lawyer and 
the former chief justice of the Washington Supreme Court, took a more 
contemplative approach by suggesting “the need for more scientifically 
derived statistics and measures of court efficiency” useful in reducing 
docket congestion.56  Finally, Commissioner Henry W. Anderson, a 
prominent Virginia lawyer, a twice-defeated candidate for Governor of 
Virginia, the president of the Virginia Bar Association, and former 
colleague of Hoover’s in the World War I famine relief effort, 
reinforced the need for statistics by proclaiming that, “far too many 
remedies had been proposed without more precise data.”57  Anderson’s 
unique claim was that “the main offenders in society were in the ‘highest 
class’ and the ‘lowest class’ while the great middle was comparatively 
law abiding.”58  Anderson accused the government as the lawbreaker 
and called for its cleanup before expecting the public to gain new 
respect for the law.59 
All of the commissioners were well-known to Hoover.  The 
Commission’s membership consisted of ten men and one woman, all 
highly respected in their fields and all with lengthy and sometimes 
controversial histories.  The number of commissioners was chosen, most 
likely, to match the number of projects that would be selected for study.  
Newton D. Baker and George Wickersham were the most prominent 
practitioner-scholars while all except the law professor Roscoe Pound 
(the only academic) were distinguished practitioners.  Baker had been 
President Wilson’s embattled Secretary of War and an acclaimed 
architect of World War I planning; an author; and later a partner in the 
Cleveland law firm of Baker, Hostetler & Sidlo.60  Wickersham, as a 
former U.S. Attorney General, had shown his teeth in the Taft era when 
he aggressively prosecuted several corporate trusts and had opposed 
federal incorporation of the Rockefeller Foundation, a special-interest 
organization with a slick method for further empowering John D. 
 
56. Id. at 80; see Minutes, supra note 54.  
57. CALDER, supra note 32, at 80; Minutes, supra note 54. 
58. CALDER, supra note 32, at 80. 
59. Id.; Minutes, supra note 54. 
60. See generally SEWARD W. LIVERMORE, POLITICS IS ADJOURNED: WOODROW 
WILSON AND THE WAR CONGRESS, 1916–1918 (1966) (providing a discussion of Baker’s 
situation during World War I). 
11 CALDER (DO NOT DELETE) 6/23/2013  11:17 AM 
1056 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [96:1035 
Rockefeller’s Standard Oil Company.61  As the law professor William F. 
Swindler once quipped, Wickersham “was aware . . . of the difference 
between efficiency and monopoly.  The answer to him was a form of 
government surveillance to promote efficiency and to control 
monopoly.”62  Wickersham feared that the legal system lacked the 
capacity to keep watch over a growing threat, and thus “he seized upon 
the only (though imperfect) weapon at his command, the Sherman Act, 
and set out to slay giants.”63 
Although the Commission was headed by a profoundly skilled 
lawyer and former U.S. Attorney General, Pound was clearly the 
Commission’s anchoring intellectual giant and one of America’s most 
towering legal scholars.  As professor and then dean of the Harvard Law 
School, he had authored several articles and books on criminal justice 
and had made significant contributions to legal theory development.  He 
had real-world experience, also, in leading the Cleveland crime 
commission study in 1922 and was thereby well-suited for calming 
contentious internal factions.64  In part, his role was to attract the best 
minds to the Commission’s consulting projects while remaining fiercely 
independent on the matters within his expertise.  Persistently direct in 
written communications, for example, he wrote to Commission secretary 
Max Lowenthal concerning the credentials of a particular judge who had 
applied to serve.  Pound used the occasion to offer views on the public’s 
knowledge of the federal judiciary’s failings:  
What I do know is that very few people in this country have any 
adequate notion of the problem of judicial organization.  I have 
been studying that since 1906, and know that it is a very big 
problem . . . . 
 I have not talked with a federal judge yet who had any 
conception whatever of judicial organization beyond that of his 
own state.65 
 
61. 2 HENRY F. PRINGLE, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT 662 
(1964). 
62. WILLIAM F. SWINDLER, COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN THE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY: THE OLD LEGALITY 1889–1932, at 137 (1969). 
63. Id. 
64. Some evidence suggests that Pound did not actually write much of the Cleveland 
study report frequently applauded by scholars in criminology and the history of criminal 
justice.  See ALFRED BETTMAN, CRIMINAL JUSTICE SURVEYS ANALYSIS 50 (1929). 
65. CALDER, supra note 32, at 81 (omission in original); Letter from Roscoe Pound to 
Max Lowenthal (Aug. 3, 1929) (on file at the National Archives and Records Administration 
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Adding more criticism based on his experiences, Pound wrote two 
district judges with whom he had discussed the problem and who had 
“denied that they had the power to comment on the evidence in a 
charge to the jury.  It is that sort of thing which we are up against in any 
attempt to do something for judicial organization and procedure in this 
country.”66  Pound could also be complimentary.  On the work of the 
criminologist Sheldon Glueck, he wrote, “Glueck’s work is absolutely 
first class,”67 and concerning the social work expert Edith Abbott, he 
wrote, “I am rejoiced that [she] is to undertake criminal justice and the 
foreign born.  No one could be better.  She is the sort of ‘expert’ who 
can be of use to you.”68 
A long list of advisers and consultants constituted a virtual who’s 
who of pre- and post-1930s behavioral and social sciences, criminology, 
the law, and practitioners from specializations throughout criminal 
justice organizations nationwide.  Every academic discipline 
demonstrating a published concern for crime and justice administration 
was included.  Research support staffs included dozens of prominent 
academics of either rising or established prestige.  Independent 
investigations, published reports, and policy recommendations 
originated with such luminaries in criminology, law, and public 
administration as Edwin H. Sutherland, Thorsten Sellin, Sheldon 
Glueck, Felix Frankfurter, Raymond Moley, Francis Sayre, Samuel C. 
May, Frederic A. Ogg, W. F. Willoughby, Howard W. Odum, William E. 
Mosher, Luther Gulick, Raymond B. Fosdick, and Charles E. Merriam.  
Most research products were aimed directly at the main objectives of 
the Commission’s topical plan, but relevant peripheral interests were 
also recognized.  Consultants Sutherland and Merriam introduced 
fledgling theories and new data on crime and justice administration.  
Sutherland was already a prominent professor of criminology following 
publication of the leading textbook in the field.69  Merriam, an 
internationally recognized University of Chicago political scientist, was 
 
at RG 10, Box 24). 
66. Letter from Roscoe Pound to Max Lowenthal, supra note 65. 
67. CALDER, supra note 32, at 81 (quoting Letter from Roscoe Pound to George W. 
Wickersham (Aug. 22, 1929) (on file at the National Archives and Records Administration at 
RG 10, Box 24)). 
68. Id. (quoting Letter from Roscoe Pound to Max Lowenthal (Aug. 14, 1929) (on file at 
the National Archives and Records Administration at RG 10, Box 24)).  
69. See MARK S. GAYLORD & JOHN F. GALLIHER, THE CRIMINOLOGY OF EDWIN 
SUTHERLAND 61–65, 81 (1988).  See generally EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, CRIMINOLOGY 
(1924). 
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known for his service on the Chicago City Council, as Chairman of the 
Council Committee on Crime and author of numerous articles and 
books.70  Writing to Jerome Michael at Columbia University in August 
1929, Wickersham remarked about the quality of his research staff, “We 
have found it difficult to secure the services of the best experts in the 
country, but we have thought it wiser to employ none but the very best 
rather than to seek more rapid progress with others who are not of the 
first order.”71  Equally prestigious practitioners and university 
administrators were asked to serve as experts and consultants.  August 
Vollmer, perhaps the most recognized authority on American policing, 
had recently retired as chief of police in Berkeley, California, and was 
teaching at both the University of California and the University of 
Chicago.72  For the first year of operations Max Lowenthal filled the 
Commission’s most important administrative position: as Commission 
secretary, he was central to the forward progress and stability of the 
Commission’s work.  His exceptional administrative skills were well-
known to Hoover and Wickersham.  He calmed and coordinated diverse 
interests and specializations across the fourteen project groups, and was 
frequently called upon to soothe the ruffled feathers of talented 
members, staff, and consultants.  As a seasoned government employee 
with access to Presidents and staffers, he was equipped with invaluable 
knowledge of the networks of information on police operations and 
influential leaders, statistical compilations, personnel backgrounds, and 
other essentials useful to the commissioners.  Lowenthal’s initial 
objective, complementing Pound, was to expedite the search for 
researchers but to do so by avoiding “selection of any persons who are 
not absolutely first-rate.”73 
 
70. For a fascinating article published fourteen years before the Commission began its 
work, see Charles E. Merriam, Findings and Recommendations of the Chicago Council 
Committee on Crime, 6 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 345 (1915). 
71. Letter from George W. Wickersham to Jerome Michael (Aug. 22, 1929) (on file at 
the National Archives and Records Administration at RG 10, Box 9). 
72. Pound praised Vollmer’s work, his national reputation, “experience, wide 
information and sound sense.”  Letter from Roscoe Pound to George W. Wickersham (June 
17, 1929) (on file at the National Archives and Records Administration at RG 10, Box 24). 
73. Letter from Max Lowenthal to Roscoe Pound (June 27, 1929) (on file at the National 
Archives and Records Administration at RG 10, Box 24).  Lowenthal quit this anchor 
position in July 1930, greatly disturbed by “antics in the realm of political expediency.”  
CALDER, supra note 32, at 83.  Essentially, he concluded, the Commission’s progress was too 
frequently bogged down in debates over Prohibition and thus had drifted away from its 
central mission.  Id.  He was replaced immediately, however, and the work moved forward to 
the production of reports.  He was replaced by William F. Barry.  See id. at 81 n.33.  August 
 
11 CALDER (DO NOT DELETE) 6/23/2013  11:17 AM 
2013] BETWEEN BRAIN AND STATE 1059 
V. GETTING DOWN TO WORK 
The Commission’s structure was organized to address fourteen 
discrete subjects, appearing in fourteen reports: Prohibition; Criminal 
Statistics; Prosecution; Enforcement of Deportation Laws; Child 
Offenders in the Federal System; Federal Courts; Criminal Procedure; 
Penal Institutions, Probation, and Parole; Crime and the Foreign Born; 
Lawlessness in Law Enforcement; Cost of Crime; Causes of Crime; and 
Police.  Ultimately, these fourteen topical groups resulted in fourteen 
numbered reports.74  Clearly the Commission’s study topics were 
guaranteed to attract internal controversies.  In fact, it became 
increasingly clear throughout the succeeding months that American 
criminal justice had become a complex arena of academic and 
practitioner dialogue, and in some cases a hotbed of serious problems 
for which there were no simple solutions.  Among the new breed of 
criminologists the study of crime had taken off in many theoretical 
directions.  Policing was only beginning to address the challenges of its 
nineteenth-century legacies and its new school of professionalism.  
Courts at all levels were jammed with criminal cases, procedures were 
antiquated, and plea bargaining was a common response to severe 
caseload burdens.  Jails and prisons continued their eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century practices, which were made worse by crowdedness, 
prisoner idleness, and brutal punitive practices.75  Disagreements in 
these and other areas were manifested when some commissioners 
boycotted attendance at meetings and in a small number of cases 
delayed or refused to sign final reports.  Most disagreements, however, 
were resolved amicably and in the end the group demonstrated healthy 
signs of the contentious nature of the crime problem and its 
administration in society.  Some of the topics, indeed, were inherently 
incendiary and nearly impossible to discuss in a manner that would find 
points of consensus, such as Prohibition enforcement, deportation and 
immigration policies, police lawlessness, and juvenile crime. 
The Commission’s substantive meetings got underway in June 1929.  
 
Vollmer provided the Commission with a report of his recommendations for other 
distinguished police chiefs.  See Letter from August Vollmer to George W. Wickersham 
(Sept. 28, 1929) (on file at the National Archives and Records Administration at RG 10, Box 
24). 
74. See infra Part VI (discussing all fourteen of the official report titles). 
75. See generally SAMUEL WALKER, POPULAR JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 68–69 (1980) (discussing poor conditions in jails and prisons and the 
difficulties faced by prison administrators). 
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The research agenda was clarified, data collection and dissemination 
strategies were developed, and the division of labor was allocated.  On 
June 18, Alfred Bettman, the former special assistant to Attorney 
General A. Mitchell Palmer and an expert on World War I espionage 
cases, summarized the findings of the earlier Cleveland and Boston 
crime surveys, the models that Pound believed would serve well the 
group’s organizational interests.76  Commissioner Loesch briefed the 
group on his discussions with Walter A. Strong, publisher of the Chicago 
Daily News, a key information source on the gangster problem in 
Chicago.77  Strong had offered to arrange a “successful educational 
campaign” regarding the Commission’s work, thus lending the support 
of publicity.  Corruption and lawlessness, Loesch argued, were frequent 
occurrences among government law enforcers and this topic, he 
believed, rated high rank among the various investigations.  On June 19, 
the budget allocations for the various research projects were 
announced,78 and further discussions explored additional lessons from 
earlier and ongoing local crime commissions, police and Prohibition 
matters, and court and criminal procedures. 
In clear terms, commissioners agreed that scientific investigation 
would apply in all studies and the most recent and methodologically 
sound approaches would be employed.  As Lowenthal wrote in August 
1929,  
 
76. BETTMAN, supra note 64, at 50; Laurence C. Gerckens, Bettman of Cincinnati, in 
THE AMERICAN PLANNER: BIOGRAPHIES AND RECOLLECTIONS 120, 126 (Donald A. 
Krueckeberg ed., 1983).  Bettman graduated from Harvard Law School in 1898, after which 
he worked as a prosecutor in Ohio and then as a special assistant to the U.S. Attorney 
General on matters involving espionage and the alien enemy law.  Gerckens, supra, at 121–22, 
126.  He then worked for Roscoe Pound on the Cleveland crime survey.  BETTMAN, supra 
note 64, at 50. 
77. Commissioner Frank Loesch and Walter A. Strong, the publisher of the Chicago 
Daily News, among a small number of others, played a key role in gathering and transmitting 
intelligence on the Al Capone outfit and other racketeer groups in Chicago.  See the 
following works for brief discussions of their roles in the Capone investigation in particular: 
LAURENCE BERGREEN, CAPONE: THE MAN AND THE ERA 293, 364 (1994); HOOVER, supra 
note 25, at 276–77; and ROBERT J. SCHOENBERG, MR. CAPONE 172, 203–04 (1992). 
78. Resolutions were reached on the budgets for ten major research topics: causes of 
crime ($15,700); costs of crime ($7,500); courts ($6,000); crime and the foreign born ($7,500); 
official lawlessness ($12,500); police ($5,000); penal institutions, probation, and parole 
($6,500); Prohibition ($50,000); prosecution ($7,500); and statistics ($1,000).  CALDER, supra 
note 32, at 84.  The Congress had authorized an initial total operating budget of $250,000.  
Dry Foes to Oppose Wickersham Board in Obtaining Funds, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1929, at 1.  
This total was later doubled.  Arthur Crawford, Hoover Signs; Wins His Point; Congress 
Ends, CHI. TRIB., July 4, 1930, at 1 (noting the appropriation of an additional $250,000). 
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We are endeavoring in the fields of our study to proceed in a 
spirit of scientific inquiry, to put before the country only data 
which has been arrived at scientifically and impartially, so that 
the country may have a real foundation of facts on which to 
consider each aspect of what the President in appointing this 
Commission called “the dominant issue before the American 
people.”79 
State-of-the-art survey research was used to acquire data pertaining to 
hundreds of questions posed to authorities at all levels of government 
and from influential organizations and individuals.  For example, one 
survey of police manpower found that six American cities had 
substantially higher police-to-population ratios than six European cities, 
which suggested that crime was a function of police presence.80  
Psychological consultants developed several attitude studies pertaining 
to crime, prohibition enforcement, and criminal court practices.  Other 
experts—such as economists, law professors, political scientists, and 
sociologists—were responsible for developing most of the survey 
instruments.  The Commission also employed public hearings, and in 
them the commissioners sought to acquire information from 
knowledgeable persons.  The Commission did not use hearings “merely 
to satisfy the desires of various individuals to air their views.”81 
VI. PHASES OF THE COMMISSION’S WORK AND THE WORK PRODUCTS 
The Wickersham Commission’s congressional funding came through 
beginning July 1, 1929.  Work evolved in four distinct phases over the 
succeeding twenty-five months in which the Commission faced the dual 
pressures of sustaining high-quality research and writing and knowing 
that both funding and time were in short supply. 
The first phase included a series of regular meetings in Washington 
in the late spring, early summer, and fall of 1929, pressing on into the 
spring of 1930.  Early sessions were held behind closed doors and were 
devoted to the organization and conceptualization of the subjects for 
assignment to project consultants.  Definitions of project priorities were 
 
79. CALDER, supra note 32, at 85 (quoting a Letter from Max Lowenthal to D. Stevens 
(Aug. 1929) (on file at the National Archives and Records Administration at RG 10, Box 9)); 
see also Text of President Hoover’s Address, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1929, at 2 (memorializing 
the speech in which Hoover spoke the quoted phrase). 
80. Wickersham Commission Survey Results for June and July 1929 (on file at the 
National Archives and Records Administration at RG 10, Box 4)). 
81. Letter from Max Lowenthal to Roscoe Pound, supra note 73. 
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critical since the process for securing expert commitments would require 
considerable time.  As field research projects got underway, 
communications back and forth between Wickersham, Pound, 
Lowenthal, and others increased exponentially.  Letters and reports 
appeared to reflect the excitement of any new venture in which the 
researcher was asked to apply what he or she knew well to a focused 
task.  The Commission returned to an en banc meeting on September 4 
to assess progress, firm up the list of consultants, and outline project 
approaches.  Some members of the Congress were publicly bothered by 
the alleged secrecy of the Commission’s activities, but Hoover and 
Wickersham held firm to a plan to wait until spring 1930 to hold public 
hearings.  First priority was given to the Prohibition study group since 
that was the pressure-filled topic of interest to some in the Congress.  
Wickersham was clear, however, that the other projects were equally 
important.  This balance was symbolized in the chair’s meeting with 
several of the nation’s prominent police chiefs in Washington in late 
September.82  Wickersham assigned himself as chairman of the 
Prohibition group but remained in an ex officio capacity.  Newton 
Baker, an opponent of constitutional Prohibition; Judge Kenyon, an 
ardent Prohibition advocate; and Dean Ada Comstock, who had no 
pronounced opinions on the subject, rounded out the full membership.  
Early projects and surveys, such as crime and crime statistics, federal 
courts, criminal procedures, crime and the foreign born, penal 
institutions, and crime causation commenced work at the home offices 
of the consultants in various university and professional organizations 
across the country. 
By October a considerable amount of work had been accomplished 
just as several news reports elevated concerns about the six major prison 
riots that had occurred during the summer and early fall of 1929.83  Even 
more challenging to a warm welcome of early results was a preliminary 
report’s dispatch to the White House on “Black Monday,” the day of 
 
82. Police Chiefs Confer upon Crime in Cities, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 24, 1929, 
at 4. 
83. During mid- to late-1929, several deadly riots occurred at some of the most densely 
populated and outmoded prisons in the United States.  Particularly noteworthy are the riots 
in New York at Auburn, Dannemora, and Sing Sing prisons and the federal prison riot on 
August 1, 1929, at Leavenworth Penitentiary in Kansas.  See, e.g., 3,700 Convicts Riot at 
Leavenworth; One Dead, Many Hurt, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1929, at 1; Many Prison Riots in 
Last Six Months, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1929, at 3.  Hoover maintained close watch over the 
evolving circumstances in these matters.  See, e.g., Statement on Plans for Federal Prison 
Reform, 1929 PUB. PAPERS 245, 245–46 (Aug. 6, 1929). 
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the stock market crash.  Instantly, the news of economic matters 
trumped crime and justice system reforms.  Even so, Hoover announced 
that he would review the report in December before submitting it to the 
Congress in January 1930.  Simultaneously he announced increased law 
enforcement and prosecution efforts in the various federal districts.  Not 
long thereafter, Senators Carter Glass of Virginia and William Harris of 
Georgia accused the White House of conducting a “star chamber” 
process on the matter of Prohibition by allowing the Commission to 
theretofore deliberate in secret meetings.84  Glass and Harris had been 
instrumental in securing the funds for the Commission’s work and they 
insisted on a clear resolution of the Prohibition matter.  The fuss 
extended for several months and the controversy threatened to cut off 
further funding of the Commission’s work beyond the end of the fiscal 
year. 
During spring 1930 Wickersham and officials in top government and 
private sector positions went on the lecture circuit as the consultants 
carried on their studies.85  Wickersham lectured on several topics in legal 
circles;86 Hoover carried out more formal law enforcement speeches;87 
Attorney General Mitchell put pressure on U.S. attorneys to control the 
number of dropped prosecutions in liquor law cases;88 the United States 
Attorney for Washington, D.C., Charles Tuttle, announced an 
investigation into bail bonds extortion;89 Prohibition Commissioner 
James Doran spoke of his agency’s need for more men to support his 
more aggressive enforcement practices;90 the president of the American 
Automobile Association, T.P. Henry, urged improved laws to curb the 
number of stolen automobiles;91 and the historian James Truslow Adams 
enlightened the public with a perspective that America had a long 
tradition of lawlessness.92 
Phase two began in the spring of 1930 with yet another outburst of 
 
84. Senate Drys Hit Wickersham Board, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1929, at 14. 
85. Lays Lawlessness to Weak Judiciary, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1930, at 21. 
86. Wickersham Says Public Is Dissatisfied With Law, WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 1930, at 7. 
87. Wickersham Flays America’s Prisons, WASH. POST, May 9, 1930, at 3. 
88. Mitchell Curbs His Aides on Dropping Liquor Cases; Dry Senators in New Clash, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1929, at 1. 
89. Tuttle to Conduct Bail Bond Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1930, at 15. 
90. Doran Backs Guns to Enforce Law, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1930, at 10. 
91. Declares Car Thief Abets Other Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1930, at 16.  
92. James Truslow Adams, Our Deep-Rooted Lawlessness, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1930, 
§ 5, at 1. 
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controversy from congressional quarters.  On May 1, 1930, the Congress 
was asked for a supplemental appropriation bill for the fiscal year 1931 
to secure an additional $250,000 to allow the Commission’s work to 
continue.  Congressional reaction was hostile, particularly from “dry” 
circles influenced mainly by Senator Glass, Representative Fiorello 
LaGuardia, and others.  Harkening back to Hoover’s broad 
interpretation of the use of funds to study far more than the Prohibition 
problems, the aging Senator Glass announced that he would seek to cut 
off the Commission’s funds.93  Hoover, greatly angered by the 
narrowness of Glass’s perspective, proposed to fund the Commission 
with private finances, immediately running headlong into a question of 
whether or not this was constitutional.  On May 27, the day Hoover 
signed the law transferring the Prohibition Bureau to the Justice 
Department and other legislation to create two additional prisons, 
Wickersham told fellow commissioner Newton Baker that Senator 
Glass’s resolution had passed.  Most of the commissioners were 
supportive of Hoover’s approach and agreed to continue, however, 
although from the judges on the Commission there were some concerns 
about the legality of private funding.  Hoover stood his ground when, on 
June 27, he issued a public statement in which he acknowledged 
congressional resistance to the new appropriations for the Commission’s 
work but insisted that the other areas of commission work required 
attention.  The date set by the original funding authorization for an end 
to the Commission’s work was June 30, 1930.  Tensions grew in the 
standoff between the House, the Senate, and the White House.  Pushing 
his insistence one step further and reminding the Congress that 
commissioners were “volunteers serving solely out of regard to public 
interest,” Hoover announced that he would “secure from private 
sources the $100,000 necessary to carry this work forward to 
completion.”  Astutely, the statement included a suggestion that the 
Commission should establish a separate committee on Prohibition.94  
After two weeks of controversy, the Senate finally conceded to provide 
an additional amount of $250,000 for the Commission’s continuation for 
one more year.95  If there was one redeeming quality to the entire 
matter, it was that the public and the Congress were put on notice in an 
 
93. Committee Votes Crime Group Curb, WASH. POST, June 24, 1930, at 2; Dry 
Enforcement Shift Completed, WASH. POST, July 1, 1930, at 2. 
94. Statement on the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, 1930 
PUB. PAPERS 267 (June 27, 1930). 
95. Crawford, supra note 78. 
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abundantly clear manner that Hoover’s objective was to study all the 
originally intended topics in the context of the criminal justice system. 
Phase three commenced in the summer of 1930 with the new funding 
in hand but with no less drama.  In late July, Commission secretary Max 
Lowenthal suddenly announced his resignation with the claim that he 
needed more time for his own research and to accommodate pressing 
family matters.96  Behind the scenes, however, others commented that 
Lowenthal had been greatly disturbed by dissension that had occurred 
among certain of the Commission members.  The announcement 
presented a small obstacle to progress, though it was somewhat easier to 
accommodate since the Commission was in summer recess.  William F. 
Barry, Lowenthal’s immediate assistant, was readily available to take 
the administrative lead.  This was a period of major study efforts by the 
consultants on all of the originally intended projects.  Wickersham 
convinced twelve law schools to join together in a study of the federal 
courts including the development and administration of a survey to 
quantify the work of all phases of trial court administration, civil and 
criminal.  Such cooperation across schools had been exceptionally rare.97  
Hardly any news of the internal workings of the individual investigations 
carried out by the consultants appeared in news releases.  A major 
dispute over crime statistics had already been resolved and most of the 
other studies had moved beyond survey stage to analysis and draft 
writing of individual reports.  Meanwhile, the President’s and the 
Attorney General’s time were taken up by the circumstances of the Al 
Capone investigation and the escalation of the veterans’ bonus issue.98 
 
96. Quits Hoover Law Board, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 1930, at 12; Wickersham Silent on 
Lowenthal’s Act, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1930, at 5. 
97. Law Schools Study of Courts Approved, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 26, 1931, at 
5. 
98. CALDER, supra note 32, at 129–31, 203–07.  Two full-length historical studies of the 
Bonus March circumstances are found in DONALD J. LISIO, THE PRESIDENT AND PROTEST: 
HOOVER, MACARTHUR, AND THE BONUS RIOT (1994), and STEPHEN R. ORTIZ, BEYOND 
THE BONUS MARCH AND GI BILL: HOW VETERAN POLITICS SHAPED THE NEW DEAL ERA 
(2010).  After taking office, President Hoover ordered the Internal Revenue Bureau (through 
Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon) and the Bureau of Investigation (through Attorney 
General William Mitchell) to conduct intensive investigations of Al Capone to find evidence 
of possible tax evasion, Prohibition offenses, and contempt of court.  See CALDER, supra note 
32, at 129.  Work on the Capone matter had evolved slowly in the last days of the Coolidge 
administration but escalated in intensity from mid-1929 to the trial, which took place October 
6–18, 1931.  Id. at 129–55.  On another domestic front, Hoover and Attorney General Mitchell 
closely monitored reports and communications to and from the White House on a matter of 
great importance to the background of the 1932 election.  During the summer of 1931, 
Hoover opposed congressional authorization to pay World War I veterans an increased loan 
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Phase four was represented by completion of the final reports during 
the period of May to the end of June 1931.  Press releases and final 
publication of all fourteen reports occurred during the following month.  
Wickersham remained in his position for a few more days after the 
commissioners cleaned out their personal belongings and returned to 
their regular positions.  Union Station in Washington was a hubbub of 
travel activity while dozens of large boxes of records were stacked up 
and awaited shipment to archival warehouses. 
It is not possible in this space to provide detailed summations of the 
fourteen volumes of commission reports.  The final reports have been 
adequately summarized in other places through the years since July 
1931, including appearances in congressional documents, law journals, 
official reports, archival reports, and national newspapers such as The 
New York Times and The Washington Post.  I will, however, briefly 
capture the major themes of these work products to demonstrate the 
high level of frank and sometimes stridently expressed debate 
concerning major issues of the times and pathways the commissioners 
found to future study initiatives.  A full reading of all the reports leaves 
the reader with an exceptionally rich education concerning the 
conditions of and informed thought about crime and justice and 
administrative processes in the 1920s.  The diversity and richness of the 
records and final reports make a compelling prima facie case for the 
achievement of Hoover’s central educational objectives.  They teach the 
nation some valuable lessons about the conditions of American justice, 
and no evidence was ever presented that there had been any 
interference in or mischaracterization of the studies by President 
Hoover.99  From the beginning of the Commission’s work in mid-1929, 
 
amount on money owed to them, believing that new taxes would be needed to fund the costs.  
Id. at 205.  This action stirred severe negative reactions in the press for the remainder of the 
year and into 1932.  Also in 1932, several thousand veterans descended on Washington, D.C. 
and set up an encampment at the Anacostia River Park.  Id. at 206–07; ORTIZ, supra, at 2.  As 
the weeks passed and more veterans arrived to expand their demonstrations conditions at the 
camp became dangerously explosive and unhealthy.  Hoover and his advisers closely 
monitored the situation for several weeks.  Ultimately, the encampment was destroyed by 
military personnel armed with bayoneted weapons and small tanks, a scene that did not help 
an already deteriorating public image of Hoover in the run-up to the 1932 campaign.  
CALDER, supra note 32, at 206–07.  For more details about these matters that occupied the 
President’s attention in 1931 and 1932, see id. at 203–07. 
99. One allegation of manipulation of the study appeared in the press.  See Hoover’s 
Hand Suspected in Doran’s Dry Law Speech, WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 1929, at 1.  The charge 
was based on news speculation that somehow George Wickersham influenced what 
Prohibition Commissioner James Doran had to say in a speech at the University of Virginia 
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Hoover was not interested in reports that merely glossed over the 
controversies in favor of blandly circumspect or shallow studies. 
Following are overviews of the reports in order of their report 
numbers.  Although there were several areas of controversy along the 
road to completion of the Commission’s work, some issues, such as 
criminal statistics and the cost of crime, required more detailed 
discussion for what they uncovered in terms of deep philosophical 
divisions that would have long-lasting implications for estimating the 
amount of crime and considering the economic burdens on society. 
No. 1:   Preliminary   Report   on   Observance   and 
Enforcement of Prohibition (26 pages)100 
Officially delivered to the Congress on January 13, 1930, the 
preliminary report made four basic recommendations: (1) The 
Department of Justice should have sole responsibility for investigation 
and preparation of all cases under the Volstead Act; (2) the many 
confusing and contradictory statutes affected by the Eighteenth 
Amendment should be codified and made more succinct; (3) the 
provisions of the padlocking portion of the enforcement statute should 
be made more effective; and (4) petty cases involving Prohibition 
violations should be handled by U.S. commissioners and thereby 
removed from federal district courts. 
No. 2: Report on the Enforcement of the Prohibition 
Laws of the United States (162 pages) 
Reports No. 1 and No. 2 reflected the measure of discord that had 
been expressed in the early Commission meetings, a circumstance that 
should not have been unexpected.  Hoover, after all, had made a 
purposeful decision to assemble and support the Prohibition study 
group because it represented all perspectives on the Prohibition matter.  
He had no fear of controversy.  In the end, to the amazement of some 
observers, only the refusal of Judge Monte Lemann to sign reports 
 
Institute of Public Affairs regarding the White House interest in getting the states to do more 
policing and adjudicating with respect to Prohibition cases.  See id.  Even granting the 
possibility of such alleged influence, it would have been unnecessary in view of so many 
earlier public statements by Hoover and Wickersham who had argued forthrightly for more 
state action and responsibility.  Moreover, Doran’s testimony before the Commission in May 
1929 was a clear indication of his appreciation of state responsibilities.  See id. 
100. Text of Two Reports by Commission on Observance and Enforcement of Dry Law, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1930, at 20. 
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stirred any recognition that the professionalism of the membership had 
been other than relatively harmonious.  More bothersome to the 
Commission, however, was contradictory testimony.  In one extreme 
example, in June 1929 Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Seymour 
Lowman offered astoundingly optimistic testimony: “I want to say to 
you of the Commission that in my opinion the amount of liquor coming 
into this country by smuggling has now been reduced to a minimum.”101  
Lowman had assumed that the amount of liquor coming in from Mexico 
was minimal because the border was well-protected and the Mexicans 
were not interested in whiskey.102  Although the Prohibition Bureau’s 
jurisdiction was limited to internal enforcement, the Customs Bureau’s 
“elaborate intelligence unit all over the world” was tracing liquor 
shipments and furnishing sufficient tariff and smuggler information.103  
Even more astounding was Lowman’s report declaring that smuggling 
from Cuba was hardly a problem, 
[B]ecause we have a close agreement with the Cuban 
Government.  The Cuban Government is cooperating with the 
American Government in a wonderful way so far as smuggling 
. . . is concerned, and our special service over there is in very 
close touch with theirs.  While there may occasionally be a little 
rum that gets into this country from Cuba, the amount is small.104 
Here was a high official of Prohibition enforcement advising the 
Commission essentially that the illegal production and distribution of 
alcohol was an internal problem that more judges and convictions could 
correct much faster than more Prohibition agents. 
Commissioner Frank Loesch was incensed.  Based on his extensive 
experiences in Chicago, he scoffed that such testimony was completely 
without foundation.  He asked,  
Will you give me an explanation that I have not been able to get 
from anyone else, how such men as [Al] Capone, [Terry 
“Machine Gun”] D[r]uggan, [Frankie] Lake, [George “Bugs”] 
Moran and others could operate on the extensive scale on which 
they are operating, and run great quantities of liquor into that 
 
101. CALDER, supra note 32, at 85. 
102. Id. 
103. Id.  
104. Id. at 85–86; Minutes, supra note 54. 
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section supposedly from Canada?105 
Loesch pointed out that Canadian authorities were unwilling to accept 
responsibility for the Volstead Act’s enforcement against liquor 
smuggling because they considered this an internal problem for the 
United States government to regulate.106  Canada’s only concern, as 
Doran had testified earlier, was in the exportation of liquor on the basis 
of completion of “an honest export paper” reflecting the true 
destination.107  Doran told Loesch, “One of the things that aids them 
[the gangsters] is the corruption at key spots” in the United States.108  
Although twenty-five agents were devoted to internal corruption 
detection, Doran reported that the vast majority of the cases these 
agents investigated were unfounded.109  This left Loesch and the other 
commissioners scratching their heads—it was hard to believe the 
Prohibition Bureau could report that success was just around the corner 
when liquor shipments continued to flow freely into the country.110  The 
Commission was tasked with making sense out of the confusion.111  The 
mandate called for the Commission to study a spectrum of criminal 
justice administration issues extending well beyond Prohibition.112  Yet 
the disharmony produced by members who agreed with Loesch only 
aggravated the ongoing sores that reached deep in the history of 
Prohibition and to the constant contradictions of hardworking 
government employees asked to enforce an impossible situation.  The 
preliminary and final reports, although detailed and voluminous, 
reflected these basic confounding circumstances.  In the end the reports 
added up to approximately 80,000 words divided into two major 
sections: the first half discussed the enforcement problems while the 
second half reflected the wide range of commissioner opinions.  When 
the votes were taken, seven commissioners (Anderson, Baker, 
Comstock, Grubb, Loesch, Mackintosh, and Pound) favored an 
immediate change while three (Kenyon, McCormick, and Wickersham) 
favored continued enforcement but a later referendum.  Lemann 
refused to sign. 
 
105. CALDER, supra note 32, at 86. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
109. Minutes, supra note 54. 
110. CALDER, supra note 32, at 86. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. 
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No. 3: Report on Criminal Statistics (203 pages) 
Oddly, the subject of crime statistics stirred considerable internal 
disagreement among those most interested in the reporting of crime to 
government agencies and outwardly to the public.  The first federal 
crime statistics had been included in Attorney General A. T. Akerman’s 
annual report of 1871, but for nearly sixty years thereafter, no formal 
system of collection and reporting had been implemented (with the 
minor exception of Census Bureau efforts in the mid-1920s).  Accurate 
statistics reflecting a comprehensive activity report of federal, state, or 
local criminal justice systems were simply not available to the 
commissioners.  New data, therefore, required development.  Felix 
Frankfurter observed: “One cannot withhold expression of the feeling 
that every contact one has with American criminal statistics discloses 
how seriously lacking we are even in the most primitive instruments of 
knowledge.”113  George Wickersham responded: “I suppose that in a 
rapidly developing civilization, reliable records note the last stages of 
progress.  Assuredly that seems to be the case in these United States.”114  
It was important for the Commission to address the issues of what data 
to collect, how to collect data, and what reports would be published 
from data collections. 
The statistics panel divided along two stridently argued points of 
view, separated mainly along academic–practitioner lines: on one side 
was Harvard law professor Sam Bass Warner, who wanted the Census 
Bureau as the central repository for crime statistics; on the other side 
were police consultants and their respective organizational affiliations in 
the International Association of Chiefs of Police (lACP) Committee on 
Uniform Crime Records and the Bureau of Municipal Research.  
Warner urged a study aimed at establishing a “‘unified system of 
criminal statistics,’ in which police, prosecution, and penal statistics 
would be uniformly collected and published.”115  Commission secretary 
Max Lowenthal held Warner in high regard for playing an instrumental 
 
113. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to George W. Wickersham (Sept. 6, 1929) (on file at 
the National Archives and Records Administration at RG 10, Box 12). 
114. Letter from George W. Wickersham to Felix Frankfurter (Sept. 10, 1929) (on file at 
the National Archives and Records Administration at RG 10, Box 12). 
115. CALDER, supra note 32, at 88 (quoting a Letter from Sam Bass Warner to Bruce 
Smith (July 5, 1929) (on file at the National Archives and Records Administration at RG 
10)); Letter from Leonard V. Harrison to George Wickersham (July 12, 1929) (on file at the 
National Archives and Records Administration at RG 10, Box 4); Letter from Sam B. 
Warner to Bruce Smith (July 5, 1929) (on file at the National Archives and Records 
Administration at RG 10, Box 4). 
11 CALDER (DO NOT DELETE) 6/23/2013  11:17 AM 
2013] BETWEEN BRAIN AND STATE 1071 
role in the introduction of prosecutorial and prisoner statistics in the 
Census Bureau.  Warner aimed to standardize the reporting of statistics 
on crime, including data from police, jail, court, prison, probation and 
parole agencies.116  Alfred Bettman of Cincinnati, an expert on the 
operations of district attorneys and a colleague of Roscoe Pound’s 
during the Boston and Cleveland crime studies, agreed to contribute his 
research on prosecution statistics.117 
Meanwhile, the IACP had the support of major state and local crime 
commissions.118  This competing faction contended that the IACP should 
direct all national collection and interpretation of police statistics, 
ultimately turning that task over to the Department of Justice.  The 
faction 
included the membership of the IACP’s Advisory Committee on 
the Uniform Crime Reports, including Bruce Smith, police 
consultant; William Rutledge, commissioner of police in Detroit; 
August Vollmer, chief of police in Berkeley, California; and 
advisory committee members Leonard V. Harrison [of the] New 
York City Police Department; and J. Edgar Hoover . . . of the 
Bureau of Investigation.119 
Author and attorney Raymond B. Fosdick also entered the fray.120  
 
116. Id.; see also id. at 242 n.59 (summarizing a 1927 Census Bureau report titled 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPILING CRIMINAL STATISTICS). 
117. Id. at 88 (citing a Letter from Max Lowenthal to Roscoe Pound (July 28, 1929) (on 
file at the National Archives and Records Administration at RG 10, Box 24)).  Bettman had 
previously worked as an assistant to John Lord O’Brian when O’Brian was an Assistant 
Attorney General for the Justice Department’s war legislation division.  Id. at 242 n.60; 
Named Aide to Hoover Law Board, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1929, at 12.  Warner opposed the 
federal government’s collection and publication of police crime data for four reasons: 
First, he believed that police data were collected and published for an insignificant 
part of the country.  Second, local police data were, by definition, unreliable 
indicators of the crime picture.  Third, federal law enforcement statistics were not 
included, and to include them would require lengthy development.  Finally, Warner 
argued that state statistical bureaus should serve as receiving points for police 
statistics before they were passed to the Bureau of Census.  The latter proposal 
suggested that police statistics should have been treated no differently from judicial 
statistics, with parallel collection remaining at the state level. 
CALDER, supra note 32, at 88–89. 
118. Police Chiefs Confer upon Crime in Cities, supra note 82, at 4. 
119. CALDER, supra note 32, at 89.  There were several other members.  See id. at 242 
n.61. 
120. In rather blunt terms, Smith offered a summary of the IACP's perspective.  Id. at 
89.  Beginning in 1927, the IACP organized a “‘complete scheme for national crime 
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Wickersham, Roscoe Pound, and Sam Warner were equally boisterous 
in their opposition to police statistics as the only significant measure of 
crime. 
The only common ground was an intellectual agreement among the 
adversaries that criminal justice policy could not advance without 
improved statistical collection.  Reporting to the full commission on 
March 12, 1930, Chairman Wickersham concluded, “The more the work 
in the various branches of the Commission’s inquiry continues, and 
particularly the work with respect to activities of the Federal 
Government, the more it becomes obvious that a thorough survey and 
overhaul of the statistics of the Federal administration of criminal justice 
is necessary.”121  The Commission had every intention of compiling 
model statistics for later use by the state agencies.  Correspondingly, it 
also desired to cultivate political support for state statistics units while 
crafting a codified and systematic arrangement of data to blend with 
federally collected information.  Naturally, the latter objective was an 
uphill climb.  Commissioners could not always agree on which statistics 
should enter the model and which statistics were likely to be available 
from state or local governments.122  The Department of Commerce had 
observed in June 1929 that authoritative and reliable statistics were 
available in only a few jurisdictions.  By retaining Morris Ploscowe to 
give particular attention to federal criminal statistics, the Commission 
believed that 
 
accounting, comprising manuals for the use of police departments and a national bureau of 
criminal statistics, record forms, and a detailed procedure’ that had already received the 
approval of numerous police departments.”  Id.  Warner became an unyielding opponent of 
the IACP system during the summer of 1929.  Id.  Wickersham requested that Warner report 
on crime statistics following the Commission’s first meeting.  Id.  Warner submitted his 
completed report to Max Lowenthal on June 14.  Id.  In his report, Warner extensively 
critiqued the availability of police agency crime statistics as well as the agencies’ statistical 
gathering techniques.  Id.  Warner argued that police evaluations of the extent of crime in the 
United States lacked statistical rigor.  Id.  Moreover, he posited that respect for criminal 
statistics would improve overall if the Department of Commerce’s Census Bureau performed 
the data collection and analysis.  Id.  After all, he asked, “[W]hat agency of the federal 
government had more experience with statistical matters than census[?]”  Id.  Further study 
of the options proceeded in spite of the increasing interpersonal hostilities of those involved.  
Id. 
121. Notes for the Meeting (Mar. 12, 1930) (on file at the National Archives and 
Records Administration at RG 10, Box 19). 
122. Data on race, nationality, or country of birth of offenders were rarely available 
from city governments.  Sam Warner wanted to collect such information via the Census.  
Letter from Charles H. Willard to Sam B. Warner (Nov. 26, 1929) (on file at the National 
Archives and Records Administration at RG 10, Box 31). 
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the subject of statistics lies at the very threshold of any 
consideration of the problem of crime in the United States [and 
that] it is of the utmost importance that every state as well as the 
national government should adopt the best, the most thorough, 
the most informative scientific basis of keeping statistical records 
pertaining to crime.123 
The police faction promoted legislation to create a bureau in the 
Justice Department specifically organized for the collection of “uniform 
crime reports.”124  Bruce Smith was convinced that it was “rather 
doubtful whether the support of the police chiefs for any other system 
could be secured; and I am sure that without such support from 
individual police departments, no system of police statistics can even get 
under way.”125  The police chiefs took a firm stance against Warner’s 
proposal.  Smith linked the interests of the IACP to those of the Justice 
Department’s Bureau of Identification and Information, and he claimed 
that the bureau had been “originally established through the almost 
unaided efforts of the [IACP].  It follows that the Association has a very 
special and intimate interest in that Bureau and desires to make the 
monthly and annual returns [i.e., crime reports] to it.”126  Smith drew the 
battle lines over centralized police statistics, and he refused to concede 
to any portion of Warner’s opposition.127  Bureau of Investigation 
director J. Edgar Hoover, a crony, was the beneficiary of centralized 
Justice Department statistics.128 
In the middle of the fray, Roscoe Pound accused Raymond Moley of 
politicizing the statistics issue in an effort to embarrass the President.  
Moley was agitated by this charge and appeared to threaten to take this 
issue further.  Baker cut through the fog of personality differences, petty 
jealousies, and internal politics.  Writing to Moley in late October, he 
concluded that the differences of view did not “involve the principles 
upon which the collection of statistics should be based, but rather the 
appropriate agency through which those principles [of statistics 
 
123. George Wickersham, Address to the Boston Chamber of Commerce (Mar. 12, 
1931) (on file at the National Archives and Records Administration at RG 10, Box 33). 
124. CALDER, supra note 32, at 90. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. at 90–91. 
127. Id. at 91 (citing a Letter from Bruce Smith to Leonard V. Harrison (July 9, 1929) 
(on file at the National Archives and Records Administration at RG 10, Box 31)). 
128. Id.  
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collection] should be applied.”129  Baker was completely exhausted by 
the whole matter.  He wanted a resolution, telling Moley, 
I cannot . . . imagine that the difference is either very 
fundamental or very important. . . .  You will be interested to 
know that I am getting letters from all over the United States on 
this subject, which rather mystifies me, since such casual 
knowledge as I have of the matter would hardly seem to justify 
the summoning of so many forces.130 
Lowenthal had hoped he could be present at the bargaining session 
between the competitors: “I thought maybe you [Sam Warner] mightn’t 
mind my sitting in for a few minutes to see how science works and truth 
and wisdom are arrived at.”131 
Warner and Pound “had come up against a deepening tradition of 
police professionalism[,] which had strong roots in the links between 
several young, aggressive thinkers and police chiefs who were part of the 
new wave of municipal reform.”132  On June 11, 1930, the Bureau of 
Investigation received statutory authority to collect and report only 
police statistics.133  After all his work to foster the introduction of 
comprehensive, multiagency statistics, Warner’s legacy was a lonely, yet 
spirited retort to his victorious adversaries that he published in the 
Harvard Law Review.134  The outcome determined the approach to 
crime statistics for the next twenty-five years.  In the end, one eloquent 
review of the Commission’s work on statistics observed, 
 
[I]f the Wickersham Commission (and its experts, the latter of 
whom did have an understanding of the grief involved in the 
beginnings of this task) had given their blessing to the existing 
project [of police-collected statistics], and had suggested concrete 
steps for remedying apparent and anticipated defects, the 
 
129. Letter from Newton D. Baker to Raymond Moley (Oct. 28, 1929) (on file at the 
National Archives and Records Administration at RG 10, Box 4). 
130. Id. 
131. Letter from Max Lowenthal to Sam B. Warner (Sept. 23, 1929) (on file at the 
National Archives and Records Administration at RG 10, Box 31). 
132. CALDER, supra note 32, at 95; see also Thomas A. Reppetto, Bruce Smith: Police 
Reform in the United States, in PIONEERS IN POLICING 191, 191–92 (Philip John Stead ed., 
1977). 
133. CALDER, supra note 32, at 95. 
134. Id.  See generally Sam Bass Warner, Crimes Known to the Police—An Index of 
Crime?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 307 (1931). 
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gathering of criminal statistics which the Commission so 
emphatically approved would have been furthered, rather than 
retarded to no particular purpose.135 
No. 4: Report on Prosecution (337 pages) 
This report was largely written by Commission consultant Alfred 
Bettman, who was then considered one of the foremost international 
experts on the work of prosecutors’ offices.  It contained a somewhat 
tedious outline of the criminal prosecution function in the United States.  
It moved on to the central concern for the political position faced by 
most prosecutors since they were mostly elected officials who sought the 
further benefits of their performance in achieving higher political 
offices.  Other defects of the prosecution function included office 
disorganization, decentralization of activities and widespread diffusion 
of responsibilities, and general incompetence or low staffing in many 
prosecutors’ offices.  The report offered five recommendations 
addressing the prosecutorial offices and prosecutor competency, 
removal of political aspects in selection, improved organization of office 
functions, prospective state controls on prosecutors, and the review of 
the grand jury system. 
No. 5: Report on the Enforcement of the Deportation 
Laws of the United States (179 pages) 
The deportation study was largely comprised of a report by attorney 
Ruben Oppenheimer, from Baltimore, who detailed enforcement 
conditions.  Essentially, the study argued with the support of data that 
deportation laws and the attendant elements of administration were 
grossly defective and unjust.  The study points out that there was reason 
to believe that many aliens had been subjected to Labor Department 
investigations and hearings and were deported for insufficient reasons 
although many rightfully could have remained in the United States.  In 
essence, aliens were not provided with any system or procedure that 
required a court hearing, only administrative rulings by the Labor 
Department.  Nine of the commissioners signed the report in full 
agreement with its findings while two dissented for reasons tied to either 
the insufficiency of the evidence presented by Oppenheimer or the need 
for a special commission to handle deportation cases. 
 
135. Lent D. Upson, Report on Criminal Statistics, 30 MICH. L. REV. 70, 74 (1931). 
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No. 6: Report on Child Offender in the Federal System of 
Justice (175 pages) 
Juvenile crime also interested the Commission, especially since the 
federal government had virtually no resources to address the problem.136  
Clifford Shaw’s work with delinquents had been widely publicized and 
was thus made useful as a primary source of information.  The 
Commission’s director of research, Clair Wilcox, commented on Shaw’s 
work after observing the methodology of several previous studies: 
“Most of our inquiries have related primarily to urban areas because it is 
there that material is most readily to be collected and it is there that the 
problem of organized crime makes its appearance.”137  The final report 
would be the federal government’s first formal reflection on juvenile 
crime and the operations of the court system when juveniles came 
before it.  The report’s many sections summarized data on “the number 
of children violating federal laws, methods used in children’s cases by 
federal authorities, and possibilities for more adequate treatment of 
juvenile offenders.”138  Hoover used the report to inform his proposals 
for changing federal practices regarding criminal actions involving 
juvenile offenders.139  The problem had been that juvenile offenders 
were treated like adult offenders and there was no juvenile probation 
system in place to move them quickly out of deplorable institutions.  
Hoover, in fact, wanted to move all juvenile offenders under federal 
control back to state control, especially since the vast majority of such 
persons had been convicted of acts that resulted in crossing state 
jurisdictional lines.140 
No. 7: Progress Report on the Study of Federal Courts 
(123 pages) 
In early 1929, the dean of the Yale Law School, Robert Hutchins, 
proposed to Herbert Hoover that a special study was needed of the 
federal courts.  Modeled on a state court study, the Commission was 
chartered to study federal courts in Connecticut, West Virginia, Ohio, 
and Louisiana.  Central to this study was a review of a massive number 
of civil and criminal cases over a five-year period.  The federal courts 
 
136. CALDER, supra note 32, at 98. 
137. Id. (quoting a Letter from Clair H. Wilcox to B. L. Melvin (May 12, 1931) (on file at 
the National Archives and Records Administration at RG 10, Box 18)). 
138. Id. 
139. Id. 
140. Hoover Urges States to Protect Children, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1931, at 16. 
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committee on this study was comprised of the deans of twelve of the 
best law schools in the nation.  Work began in August 1930 and ended in 
June 1931 with the committee report. 
No. 8: Report on Criminal Procedure (51 pages) 
In one of the briefest Commission reports, only fifty-one pages in 
length, George Wickersham was able to complete an objective that he 
had worked on for several years: the adoption of many of the American 
Law Institute’s recommendations for revising federal and state criminal 
procedures.  The committee on criminal procedures produced 
significant evidence of antiquated procedures that had contributed to 
delays and higher costs to local governments, along with rampant 
political influences on prosecutors and judicial functions.  Pound and 
Wickersham believed that the work to modernize criminal procedures 
had finally reached a level of public interest and that it was possible to 
find support for change in legislative bodies.  Wickersham’s proposed 
recommendations included less-than-unanimous jury verdicts in non-
capital cases, simplified appellate processes, procedures to determine 
mental conditions of defendants, waiving of jury trials in certain cases, 
summons in lieu of warrants in minor cases, bail discretion rules, 
prosecution by information rather than indictment, simplified 
indictment processes, rules for offenses involving crimes related to in-
flight aircraft, and rules for protracted trials and trials in which a 
member of a jury dies or becomes ill.141 
No. 9: Report on Penal Institutions, Probation and Parole 
(343 pages) 
The Commission’s work on prisons, jails, and pre- and post-
institutional care was conducted by some of the most distinguished 
experts in the nation on these subjects: Dr. Frank Tannenbaum and Dr. 
Hastings Hart.  The authors relied upon extensive information and 
research from an advisory committee comprised of the most prominent 
leaders in the jail and prison fields in the several states—a virtual who’s 
who of penal institutions work.  The report’s seven sections provided 
extensive exploration of the state of penal institutions in the United 
States; classification processes for prisoners; labor and industry in 
institutions; education for prisoners; parole practices; probation 
 
141. Efficiency Urged in Court Procedure, WASH. POST, May 11, 1930, at 2 (describing 
changes proposed by Wickersham while he was president of the ALI). 
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practices; and concluding remarks.  Mainly focused on state and local 
systems, the report summarized conditions of substantial overcrowding, 
disciplinary practices, weak or entirely inadequate education provisions, 
gross deterioration of reformatories for juveniles, abusive labor and 
industry practices, and deficient probation and parole practices.  A 
special paper was also provided on the deplorable conditions in jails 
across the nation.  Overall, despite its strong indicators of conditions 
and practices violating basic principles of concern to progressives in the 
1920s, this report had no natural political alliances in the Congress.  
Even with a significant number of prison riots in the summer of 1929, it 
appeared that many more decades of advances in the new methods of 
penology would be required before popular concerns would match the 
concerns of the Wickersham Commission findings.  Chairman 
Wickersham, upon reading the final report, was greatly disturbed that it 
had failed to carefully distinguish between conditions in state versus 
federal institutions.  He wrote to Federal Prison Director Sanford Bates 
to acknowledge this failure and to make note of the significant progress 
that had been made in the previous two years in upgrading all federal 
prison facilities and provisions.142  Many state officials admitted to the 
horrible conditions present in their prison facilities while others 
remained defensive.143 
No. 10: Report on Crime and the Foreign Born (416 
pages) 
Of special concern to the Commission was crime among the foreign-
born.  Post-World War I nativist generated interest in this topic due to 
their belief that immigrant populations were more criminal in nature 
than other groups.144  The Commission’s objective was to take up “the 
question whether or not there was an undue proportion of crime coming 
into the mill of justice from the foreign born.”145  In 1926, for example, 
Carl Kelsey wrote, 
[W]e have sought evidence to justify our emotional reaction 
against strangers.  It is discovered that criminals have entered the 
country as well as missionaries and we have sought to 
 
142. Wickersham Sorry for Penal Report, WASH. POST, July 31, 1931, at 4. 
143. Prison Heads Admit Need for Reforms, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1931, at 19. 
144. CALDER, supra note 32, at 95. 
145. Id. at 95–96 (quoting a Letter from George W. Wickersham to Commission (June 3, 
1930) (on file at the National Archives and Records Administration at RG 10, Box 10)). 
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understand, unconsciously hoping that our study would show 
that the later arrivals were more likely to be criminals than were 
their predecessors.146 
However, “[i]n the three years after Kelsey’s observations, several 
studies failed to show a link between immigrants and crime.”147  
Commission consultant Edith Abbott commented, “[C]harging our high 
crime rates against the foreign-born is merely evading the real 
difficulties of life, instead of trying to solve them.”148  In the main, the 
fallacy, she noted, “lies in the ready acceptance of the easy theory that 
our social difficulties are not to be charged to our own mistakes and 
failures.”149  Abbott went on to conclude that:  
For more than a century there has been continuously in this 
country a clamorous group who have tended to emphasize only 
the difficulties connected with immigration and to lose sight of 
all its beneficial effects.  Unfortunately these attacks on the alien 
have frequently laid stress on the popularly supposed relation 
between immigration and crime.  Statistics have never justified 
their assumptions.150 
Her analyses for the Chicago Crime Commission in 1915 had, in fact, 
similarly concluded that the native-born, not the alien, contributed a 
substantially larger percentage of crime.151  In contrast to nativist views, 
Abbott believed that “we should be seriously disturbed that in the 
enforcement of the law the alien does not at all times meet with the even 
handed justice that America demands.”152  With patience and tact 
Abbott’s final report in June 1931 offered no evidence of any 
 
146. Id. at 96 (quoting Carl Kelsey, Immigration and Crime, 125 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 
POL. & SOC. SCI. 165, 165 (1926)). 
147. Id. 
148. Wickersham Board Frees Foreign-Born of Big Crime Blame, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 
1931, at 1. 
149. Id. 
150. CALDER, supra note 32, at 96 (quoting Report of Commission Consultant Edith 
Abbott’s Conclusions (on file at the National Archives and Records Administration at RG 
10, Box 2)). 
151. Id. (citing a Letter from Monte M. Lemann to Max Lowenthal (June 26, 1929) (on 
file at the National Archives and Records Administration at RG 10)); Merriam, supra note 
70, at 346–47; see also Find Foreign Born Commit Fewer Crimes, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 24, 1931, at 
3. 
152. CALDER, supra note 32, at 96 (quoting a Letter from Monte M. Lemann to Max 
Lowenthal, supra note 151); see also EDITH ABBOTT, THE TENEMENTS OF CHICAGO 1908–
1935 (1970) (reflecting similar sentiments). 
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extraordinary representation of the so-called foreign-born in crime 
statistics.153  A trail of unanswered questions seemed longer than the list of 
what had been discovered.154 
No. 11: Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement (347 
pages) 
Primarily, the study of official lawlessness inquired into police 
“‘third-degree’ tactics and other abusive justice system practices.”155  
The work was conducted by Professor Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Walter H. 
Pollak, and Carl Stern, and was announced in mid-October 1929.156  
Pound and Loesch initiated the study, “favoring a thorough 
consideration of the controversy.”157  Some on the Commission rejected 
the study for ideological reasons, whereas others were concerned that 
facts would be hard to authenticate.158  In July 1929, a preliminary paper 
on the subject was drafted, but Wickersham restricted the research 
effort shortly thereafter, fearing that congressional funding decisions for 
the entire effort could be jeopardized due to the Commission’s 
consideration of such a controversial topic.159  Chafee and his team 
 
153. NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON CRIME 
AND THE FOREIGN BORN 91–96 (1931) [hereinafter REPORT ON CRIME AND THE FOREIGN 
BORN]; Commission Clears Aliens of Excessive Crime Rate, WASH. POST, Aug. 24, 1931, at 1. 
154. Reference was made to “organized crime” in relationship to the “foreign born” 
toward the end of this report.  REPORT ON CRIME AND THE FOREIGN BORN, supra note 153, 
at 189–90.  The activities of gangsters in the Chicago and New York areas primarily 
concerned Hoover and the commissioners, but the foreign-born investigation was entirely 
free of any interference from the aggressive Hoover-driven Al Capone investigation.  
Unquestionably, people in those times tended to link immigration policies, crime among 
specific immigrant groups (typically Italian-Sicilian), and reports of gangster involvement in 
killings and corruption.  Abbott’s report, however, was light years from such activities in 
terms of its focus and methodology.  See id. at 189–93. 
155. CALDER, supra note 32, at 96. 
156. Id.  See generally Pollak and Chafee to Aid Crime Board, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1929, 
at 19. 
157. CALDER, supra note 32, at 96.  A special investigator on the “Lawlessness” study 
group, Ernest J. Hopkins, delivered a speech to the membership of the Prison Society in 1933 
observing that the work of prison administrators and staff was made more difficult when the 
police are permitted to abuse criminal offenders.  See Ernest Jerome Hopkins, The Truth 
About the Third Degree, 13 PRISON J. 16 (1933).  For a classic book on the subject, see 
EMANUEL H. LAVINE, THE THIRD DEGREE: A DETAILED AND APPALLING EXPOSÉ OF 
POLICE BRUTALITY (1930). 
158. CALDER, supra note 32, at 96. 
159. Id. (citing a Letter from George W. Wickersham to Kenneth R. Mackintosh (July 
18, 1930) (on file at the National Archives and Records Administration at RG 10, Box 19)); 
see also Letter from Zechariah Chafee, Jr., to Max Lowenthal (Feb. 21, 1930) (on file at the 
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“developed leads on hundreds of cases throughout the federal court 
system, many involving Prohibition officers who violated search warrant 
requirements and used brutality in arrests, as well as numerous acts of 
abuse that occurred in enforcing immigration statutes.”160  In particular, 
Chafee wrote to Leopold Friedman requesting that he present the full 
Commission with “the film of the police ‘rough-housing the 
Communists’” along with Friedman’s suggestions on police abuse.161  
After news accounts of the study revealed the cities in which significant 
“third degree” practices had been commonplace, police departments 
complained that facts had been distorted or constituted lies.162  President 
Hoover wrote to Solicitor General Thomas D. Thacher in late August 
1931 praising the Justice Department’s work to investigate the alleged 
brutal conduct of certain police officers in the Washington D.C. Police 
Department while acknowledging the department’s “able and devoted 
police force.”163 
No. 12: Report on the Cost of Crime (657 pages) 
During early meetings commissioners took up the costs of crime to 
the private sector, principally private protection of life and property.  
Goldthwaite H. Dorr, the assistant director of munitions during World 
 
National Archives and Records Administration at RG 10, Box 8); Letter from Max 
Lowenthal to Zechariah Chafee, Jr. (Feb. 25, 1930) (on file at the National Archives and 
Records Administration at RG 10, Box 19). 
160. Id.  See generally Police Brutality Flayed in Wickersham Report, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 
11, 1931, at 1 (providing an excellent summary of the report). 
161. CALDER, supra note 32, at 96 (quoting a Letter from George Wickersham to 
Leopold Friedman (Apr. 3, 1930) (on file at the National Archives and Records 
Administration at RG 10)); PRELIMINARY REPORT, NON-OBSERVANCE OF LAW BY 
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS ENGAGED IN ENFORCING LAWS (July 30, 1929) (on file at the 
National Archives and Records Administration at RG 10, Box 20). 
162. See Blow to Morale of Police Seen in Commission Views, WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 
1931, at 5 (quoting police chiefs who variously assert the study is biased, or that police no 
longer employ “third-degree” tactics); New York Officials Deny Being Brutal, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 11, 1931, at 12 (reporting denials from the chief of police, district attorneys, and the 
acting U.S. attorney in New York City); Wickersham Data Hit Police Forces, WASH. POST, 
Aug. 2, 1931, at 2 (reporting on the study’s findings of police abuses in New York, Chicago, 
Los Angeles, Kansas City, Cleveland, Minneapolis, Denver, and others, while notably 
bestowing unqualified praise on Milwaukee). 
163. President Spurs Brutality Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1931, at 2.  From 1874 until 
noon on January 2, 1975, the federal city of Washington, D.C., was the official responsibility 
of the President.  See Act of June 20, 1874, ch. 337, 18 Stat. 116, repealed by District of 
Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 93-198, 
§ 711, 87 Stat. 774, 818 (1973).  Moreover, the President was entrusted with naming the 
District of Columbia Commissioner.  Id. 
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War I and special assistant to the Attorney General, chaired the 
research committee, reporting to Commissioner Monte Lemann.  
Hoover had recognized during his Commerce Secretary years—as had 
many in the business community—that private police and security 
devices had become commonplace additions to law enforcement 
methods.  Wickersham has also made such observations, particularly 
with respect to the business costs associated with private guards and 
money couriers.  Businesses were encountering not only the costs of 
such crimes as burglary, larceny, and shoplifting, but also the costs of 
private detectives and insurance.  The Commission effort received only 
a small budget to carry out the innovative work of the subcommittee.  
Some corporate heads, such as Henry S. Dennison of Dennison 
Manufacturing, agreed to perform research inside their plants if secrecy 
could be maintained.164  Dennison and other business leaders had other 
interests in agreeing to study internal crime costs, namely that they 
wished to have a pretext to evaluate the positive impact of Prohibition 
on their workers.165 
Roscoe Pound was particularly interested in the costs of private 
business protections and their links to the overall economic costs of 
crime in society.  Along with this concern he wished to have the 
Commission estimate the extra costs imposed on law enforcement tied 
to crime with costs of police work if crime was reduced.166  The 
committee on ‘costs’ gave close attention to such matters as the costs of 
burglary prevention equipment, costs of armored cars for transporting 
money and valuables, and costs of private police and watchmen 
employed by large and small businesses.167  The goal was to estimate any 
costs in relationship to the administration of federal, state, and local 
governments.168  The committee encountered significant and sometimes 
intractable problems in locating reliable information, especially since it 
was necessary to request data from a diverse range of companies and 
governmental entities.169  Commission secretary Lowenthal expressed 
trepidation regarding these matters in a letter to Commissioner 
 
164. CALDER, supra note 32, at 97. 
165. Id. 
166. NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON THE COST 
OF CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (1931) [hereinafter REPORT 
ON THE COST OF CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES]. 
167. Id. at 2–3. 
168. Id. at 2. 
169. Id. at 2–4. 
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Lemann:  
I do know that a great deal of unreliable information is floating 
round and I hope that you will feel that with you on the 
Committee you will be able to make at least one important 
contribution—preventing a lot of people from palming off on us 
material which is worse than pitch.170   
The committee’s work continued with estimating federal costs but in 
mid-1930 it was forced to delay work on the private costs,171 perhaps the 
most innovative aspect of the whole project.  In the end, the 
Commission’s report on the costs of crime and its prevention was far 
ahead of its time and would find significant application in future 
investigations.172  
No. 13: Report on the Causes of Crime (862 pages in two 
volumes) 
The study of causes of crime had evolved from debates in popular 
and scholarly circles most intensively since 1900.  The Wickersham 
Commission summations and analyses of the data and theories were 
published in two parts and were focused mainly on social and 
psychological factors.  Leading these studies were such rising stars in 
criminology as Thorsten Sellin and Edwin Sutherland.  Morris Ploscowe, 
a fellow at Harvard University, joined in the oversight of the research by 
Mary van Kleeck from the Russell Sage Foundation, Dr. Emma A. 
Winslow of the United States Children’s Bureau, and Ira de Augustine 
Reid of Haverford College.  Commission member Judge Henry 
Anderson, who had originally sponsored the subgroup, abstained from 
signing the final report due to disagreement with the results.  The value 
of the two volumes lay in the skeletal outline of criminological theory 
development.  Ploscowe’s group laid out several causative factors 
contributing to the escalation of the nation’s crime problem, particularly 
with respect to criminal personality development and the decline of 
social values.  Each of these areas, Ploscowe suggested, bore the most 
promise for new research.  Economic and political factors pointed to the 
relative normality of criminal attitudes toward the acquisition of money 
 
170. Letter from Max Lowenthal to Monte Lemann (June 28, 1929) (on file at the 
National Archives and Records Administration at RG 10, Box 17). 
171. REPORT ON THE COST OF CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATE, 
supra note 166, at 2–3, 5. 
172. See generally id. at 1–9. 
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and that the sources of large amounts of money resulted from the 
corruption of political systems.  Volume 2 concentrated on the 
geographical and ecological studies in several cities by criminologists 
Clifford Shaw and Henry D. McKay.  A critique of the report concluded 
that the investigators were clearly aligned with the view that poverty 
was at the core of juvenile crime causation in addition to “conflicting 
social and cultural imperatives, distorted personalities, sub-group 
loyalties, and criminal definitions of social situations.”173 
No. 14: Report on Police (140 pages) 
The second-briefest report in the collection, a study of maladies of 
police administration, was not intended as a review of the extensive 
literature on policing already on the record.  Rather, the initiative, led 
by Berkeley’s former police chief August Vollmer, set out a limited 
number of defects in the ways police organizations were managed and 
what they needed to improve the respect of their functions by a public 
that demanded their work in capturing criminals.  In June 1929, 
exceptional pressure was put on Vollmer to set his calendar for regular 
trips to Washington from his new position as professor of police 
administration at the University of Chicago.  Wickersham had struggled 
to secure Vollmer’s participation, and he desperately needed this most 
knowledgeable and reputable expert to lead the investigation of police 
organizations and activities.174  Vollmer’s serious health problems, 
however, precluded an agreement to serve until later in 1929.  Writing 
an old friend, Vollmer said that he needed sympathy rather than 
congratulations for his grudging agreement to serve.  He left Berkeley 
on September 29 on leave for six months to begin classes in Chicago.  
Thereafter, he said, he was willing to contribute to the Commission 
Report on the Police and to the Report on Lawlessness in Law 
Enforcement.175  Aided by two assistants, Vollmer drafted the report on 
the police during the next eighteen months, resolving that there were six 
major defects in the operations of many police departments: First, police 
chiefs and their offices across the nation were largely controlled by 
 
173. J.P. Shalloo, Report on the Causes of Crime, 22 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 777, 
781 (1932). 
174. Letter from George W. Wickersham to August Vollmer (June 12, 1929) (on file at 
the National Archives and Records Administration at RG 10, Box 4). 
175. Letter from August Vollmer to George W. Wickersham (June 26, 1929) (on file at 
the National Archives and Records Administration at RG 10, Box 4). 
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political forces and their terms in the position were too short.176  Second, 
local police departments suffered from a severe shortage of competent 
police officers and supervisors and their positions largely depended on 
local political bosses.177  Third, departments lacked effective 
communications systems by which to learn about criminal actions and to 
maintain effective investigative records.178  Fourth, too many large city 
police organizations had been captured by corrupt politicians.179  Fifth, 
police executives in many cities were not prepared to deal with 
concentrations of foreign-born populations that were both key elements 
in the crime problem and in the detection and prevention of crime.180  
And sixth, far too many different types of duties were expected of police 
personnel thus calling for new types of specializations in the ways police 
work was accomplished.181 
A Fifteenth Report? 
Indeed, there was a fifteenth report containing a full accounting of 
all the expenses associated with each Commission investigation.182  It 
was, after all, a necessary element in the Commission chair’s duties to 
report to the President and the Congress how the money for this twenty-
five-month project was spent, a particularly important matter since 
criticism had come from various directions in a generally bad economic 
time.  On the day the Commission ceased operations, it was reported 
that approximately $20,000 to $25,000 of the total allocation of $500,000 
could be returned to the United States Treasury.  Chairman 
Wickersham remained in Washington in special offices near the White 
House in order to close out the accounting, box up files, and await the 
President’s official declaration that the work had been completed.183 
Lost But Later Found Report: The Mooney-Billings and 
Other Special Cases 
Springing from the Commission’s work on Lawlessness in Law 
 
176. Wickersham Report on Police, 2 AM. J. POLICE SCI. 337, 337–39 (1931). 
177. Id. at 339–40. 
178. Id. at 340–41. 
179. Id. at 341. 
180. Id. at 341–42. 
181. Id. at 342–43. 
182. Wickersham Group Will Dissolve Today, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1931, at 52. 
183. Wickersham Board Passes from Stage, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1931, at 16; Wickersham 
Group Will Dissolve Today, supra note 182. 
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Enforcement was a most contentious special-consultant investigation 
undertaken by the Harvard University law professor Zechariah Chafee, 
Jr., and the law partners Walter H. Pollak and Carl S. Stern of the New 
York firm of Engelhard, Pollak, Pitcher & Stern.  In addition to the full 
complement of work on the main body of the “Lawlessness” study, 
Chafee and Pollak had proposed studies of the 1916 California bombing 
trial and conviction known as the Mooney-Billings case.184  They also 
proposed studies of the Sacco-Vanzetti case185 and the Centralia cases186 
but there is some evidence that the Commission rejected a budget 
allocation for all of them.  Beyond the two main elements in the Report 
on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement, “The Third Degree” regarding 
police abuses, and “Unfairness in Prosecution,” the consultants had 
expected to add the special studies.  A document titled Mooney-Billings 
Report was submitted to the Commission in June 1931.187  The 
Commission then considered this report and ruled that the Mooney-
Billings document “was beyond its province to investigate individual 
cases with a view to making recommendations as to their disposition.”188  
A group of Senators, led by Senator Burton Wheeler, objected to the 
Commission’s publication of the Report on Lawlessness in Law 
Enforcement absent the Mooney-Billings report, and moved to gain 
approval of a Senate resolution to force President Hoover to forward 
the report to the Senate.189  The controversy dragged on through the fall 
and winter of 1931.  The White House and the Justice Department 
withheld the report, but in January 1932 it was officially released to the 
Senate by Attorney General Mitchell.  It was not published at taxpayer 
expense as Senator Burton had hoped.  Earlier, George Wickersham 
had reported that he had been notified of Pollak’s work on the special 
investigations but the Commission had in November 1930 rejected a 
motion to spend funds on individual cases.190  As further intrigue 
evolved in early January 1932, Attorney General Mitchell announced 
 
184. See ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., ET AL., THE MOONEY-BILLINGS REPORT:  
SUPPRESSED BY THE WICKERSHAM COMMISSION (1932). 
185. See generally ARTHUR GARFIELD HAYS, TRIAL BY PREJUDICE 319–28 (1933). 
186. See generally id. at 252–69. 
187. A private publisher, Gotham House, Inc., published the report.  See CHAFEE, JR., 
ET AL., supra note 184. 
188. Id. 
189. 3 Senators Seeking Mooney Case Data, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 1931, at M23; Delves 
Into Mooney Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1931, at 21. 
190. Letter from George W. Wickersham to Newton D. Baker (June 17, 1931) (on file at 
the National Archives and Records Administration at RG 10, Box 5). 
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that the full Chafee–Pollak–Stern 600-page document could not be 
found,191 but mysteriously it surfaced on January 9 and was forwarded to 
the Senate Judiciary Committee.  A statement was issued that the report 
had actually been submitted along with the Report on Lawlessness in 
Law Enforcement in June 1931.192  Wickersham had been disturbed by 
the discovery that Pollak had used Commission funds for the 
“Lawlessness” study and had included the study of the Mooney-Billings 
case.  Apparently at the time he urged Baker to avoid formal 
recognition of the report because of the lack of time available to the 
whole Commission and that the Commission had not been charged to 
investigate state cases.  Also, the research director, Clair Wilcox, knew 
of the study’s existence since many requests had been sent to Chafee to 
get the report completed no later than June 1, 1931.  At the time the 
draft was received, several commissioners rejected its contents flatly and 
their animosity ensured refusal to publish the final product.193 
VII. PERSPECTIVES ON CONTRIBUTIONS AND DISAPPOINTMENTS 
All Commission reports moved toward publication in the late spring 
and early summer of 1931.  President Hoover had read many of them 
during his breaks at Rapidan Camp, his Virginia retreat.  Work stopped 
by June 30 and several reports had been submitted to the White House 
or were at the Government Printing Office.194  Yet to make their public 
appearances were the reports on Police; Prisons, Parole, and Probation; 
Costs of Crime; Causes of Crime; Crime and the Foreign Born; and 
Lawlessness in Law Enforcement.  Experts returned to their positions 
with obligations only to submit their final expense statements.  Only 
office cleanup remained.  There were no celebrations of the 
Commission’s completion but newspapers expressed great anticipation 
of the reports. 
The task had been long and arduous, but it was now complete and 
subject to the normal democratic processes of contemplation and 
critique.  At this point in time—2013—we are able to look back on the 
efforts expended by the Commission and to consider some perspectives 
on what it all meant then and what markers it left for later commissions 
 
191. Wickersham Report on Mooney Is Missing; Mitchell Hunts 600-Page Book for 
Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1932, at 8. 
192. Data Aired on Mooney, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1932, at 1. 
193. Letter from George W. Wickersham to William S. Kenyon (June 17, 1931) (on file 
at the National Archives and Records Administration at RG 10, Box 5). 
194. Wickersham Group Ends Work Tonight, WASH. POST, June 30, 1931, at 2. 
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with similar missions to educate the public and inform the policy 
processes.  While it is always dangerous to impose too many conclusive 
observations on an event as complex and productive as one product in a 
president’s total efforts in a four-year administration, I offer some 
observations based on my close examination of the total effort of the 
Wickersham Commission.  I have arranged my observations, first, in 
terms of significant advances and contributions and, second, in terms of 
some disappointments.  By no means do I suggest that my listing and 
discussions of disappointments rise to the level of failures. 
A. Advances and Prospects 
True, the Wickersham Commission’s work and its final products 
were largely ignored for many years.  Little fanfare followed their mid-
1931 completion.  The nation was in no mood to recall the labors of 
eleven dedicated experts called to task by a then-popular President and 
a former Attorney General from the Taft era.  Part of the problem lay in 
President Hoover’s inability or lost interest in communicating its value.  
Part of the problem lay in the complexities and voluminous pages set 
out in the reports.  Part of the problem lay in the disastrous economic 
peril.  And part of the problem lay in the hostility of the Roosevelt 
administration to anything tied to Hoover.  The reports were not 
ignored, I argue, because of the substantive merits of what the fourteen 
volumes laid out as an agenda worthy of attention then and in later 
decades.  Indeed, they were timely and they offered real value to 
improving justice systems in the United States.  So, as dangerous as 
historical speculation can be, I count six major advances and prospects 
of the Commission’s work. 
First, President Hoover and the nation were provided with a bold, 
broadly studied, and evidence-based collection of criminal justice system 
ills.  Beyond the virtually intractable situation of Prohibition—a 
problem that held doubtful prospects for any full resolution in 1929 and 
certainly not within the power of the President—the Commission urged 
aggressive confrontation of such issues as abusive conduct by police 
agencies, unlawful conduct of federal authorities in matters of 
immigration enforcement, horrible conditions in state and local jails and 
prisons, measurement of and myth-busting about crimes of the foreign 
born, and the disorganization and obsolescence of courts and their 
procedural guidelines.  Willingness to tackle such issues demonstrated 
Hoover’s and the Commission’s willingness to take on subjects for which 
there was little political capital to be gained and for which there was 
only a small political constituency. 
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Second, perhaps without any particular objective in mind, the 
Commission’s work served as a voice box for a budding community of 
criminological scholars.  It greatly encouraged criminal justice 
professionals to think and plan for a future represented by a 
substantially greater emphasis on professionalism based on lawful 
conduct and social expectations of quality justice.  The Commission’s 
findings opened Pandora’s box by offering for public consideration what 
I often regard as “closet topics.”195  Admittedly, the Commission’s 
exposition of the justice system defects was limited, but then their time 
at work was also greatly constricted and the opportunities for 
reasonably immediate implementation thereafter completely absent. 
Third, the bold admissions reflected in the reports set new standards 
of care for succeeding studies and professional conduct associated with 
matters of justice administration.  While it is true that the reports 
reflected past and then-current conditions, revelations contained in the 
reports forced a limited number of possible reactions.  As with any form 
of cognitive dissonance, the listeners had only three basic options: fully 
agree, totally disagree, or find various ways of accommodating and 
explaining away what they heard.  The guarded and well-reasoned 
crafting of the research findings spoke directly to those police 
administrators, judges and court administrators, prosecutors and 
defense lawyers, and jail and prison wardens about conditions that a 
panel of experts (drawn mainly from their realms) called into question.  
There was no turning back from admitting to the problems.  Straight 
away, the burden of improvements was delivered into their hands, 
mainly at the state and local levels. 
Fourth, the Commission’s work was not limited to a narrowly 
framed “trial” of single issues or a set of circumstances.  From the 
 
195. In essence, “closet topics” refers to subjects that are far less likely to be openly or 
regularly discussed in conversations or written works or in social or political gatherings.  
Typically they remain behind the scenes in private contexts, and even in that setting there 
may be formal or informal limitations on expression.  Examples in modern times abound: 
illegal use of narcotics by doctors and other health care workers; annual flight of automatic 
weapons illegally smuggled into Mexico versus massive coverage of illegal narcotics entering 
the United States; sexual abuse of children and women across cultural, economic, political, or 
religious divides; and the high costs of employee and customer theft in the retail industry 
versus low prosecutorial interest in bringing indictments.  The term has been in use since at 
least the nineteenth century: “Strange stories had already begun to be told of his confused 
notions and eccentric manners, and every day it became more and more an object of real 
importance upon public grounds to avoid the necessity of discussing in the royal closet topics 
of an irritating nature.”  TORRENS M. TORRENS, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF THE RIGHT 
HONOURABLE SIR JAMES R. G. GRAHAM 434–35 (1863) (internal citations omitted). 
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beginning Hoover held to a much deeper intention, and his 
determination in this respect was largely the basis for urging the 
Commission to disallow special-case considerations, a matter that 
played out in the Mooney-Billings report controversy.  Note should be 
taken of the multiple case approach taken across the fourteen reports.  
Multiple crime theories were considered; multiple crime studies were 
reviewed to mine their contributions; multiple surveys were conducted; 
multiple police departments were consulted about lawlessness; multiple 
courts were studied; and multiple prisons and juvenile detention 
facilities were put under the glass.  There was, indeed, an intentional 
focus on representativeness of conditions and problems across the 
nation.  This was (and is) in the best tradition of social science research. 
Fifth, contrary to the opinions of some observers through time, the 
Commission’s work was not completely forgotten.196  Unquestionably, 
the Depression’s onslaught turned the general public’s attention to 
matters of economic survival.  This result was certainly not expected 
when the Commission got underway in 1929, and it was not possible for 
either the President or the Commission to simply stop its work and to 
renege on the realities of poor-quality justice administration that had 
festered for years unattended at the national level.  Forward progress in 
the work was the only option, but admittedly the downward turn in the 
economy meant that less popular interest was a distinct possibility.  The 
larger consideration, however, is that the findings and prospective 
improvements set out in the Commission’s reports, while serving as a 
general education for the public’s consumption, called for serious 
attention and response by the subject-matter experts.  Police, court, and 
prison administrative misconduct, while raising eyebrows among the 
general public, required actions by willing legislative bodies, gutsy 
mayors and state governors, and bold critical thinkers within these 
bureaucratic institutions. 
 
196. A number of sources offer competing views on the legacy of the Wickersham 
Commission.  See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN 
HISTORY 274 (1993) (“But in the end, the reports sat on the shelf; not much came of the 
commission’s many recommendations.”); JOHN P. KENNEY, POLICE ADMINISTRATION 15 
(1972) (“Surprisingly many of its recommendations are as timely today as when reported but 
major changes did not take place as a result of the Commission’s work.”); U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, PROCEEDINGS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CONFERENCE ON CRIME 198–200 
(1934) (noting in 1934 that the Wickersham reports were “gathering dust on the shelves of 
college libraries”); Richard L. Strout, Little Orphan Annie, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 
21, 1967, at 20 (recalling the Wickersham Commission’s work in the wake of the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s then-recent decision in Miranda v. Arizona). 
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And finally, the roots of the Wickersham Commission were not just 
in the past.  Rather they reached back and they reached forward by 
setting out the observed conditions that required immediate action.  
They avoided panaceas and utopian conceptions; rather, all the 
observations reflected a level of reasonableness that would allow 
federal, state, and local governments to act in ways that were consistent 
with the political expectations of progressive Republicans and 
conservative and liberal Democrats.  The “good government” 
movement that had begun in the 1890s, after all, was supported across 
the political spectrum.  What could be so horribly wrong with addressing 
affirmatively the injustices in the immigration system and its 
uncontrolled deportation practices?  What could be so wrong with 
admitting that foreign-born peoples were not responsible for the largest 
percentage of the urban crime problems?  Given the recent 
enfranchisement of women in political participation, what could be so 
wrong with addressing human trafficking by racketeers (reflecting on 
political will in 1910 to pass the Mann Act)?197  And what could be so 
wrong with admitting that the criminologists were unsettled in what 
caused crime, and what political and social incentives or disincentives 
prevented all police departments, court systems, and institutions of 
incarceration from reaching for performance levels that the professional 
researchers had no difficulty in identifying?  It was only a matter of 
time, in essence, before most of the Commission’s findings would reach 
acceptance and drive significant changes. 
B. Disappointments 
As I look back contextually on the corpus of the Commission’s work, 
I count a few glaring disappointments: 
Hoover’s intention was to assemble broad and prestigious 
representation on the Commission in order to ensure exploration of all 
the major areas of crime and justice administration.  His intentions, 
however, did not ensure representation by blacks or other racial and 
ethnic groups in American society.  Hoover had been advised by several 
commissioners and numerous citizens to include blacks and others as 
commissioners and participants in the studies.  Black leaders argued that 
blacks had endured more than a century of police abuse, rigged 
 
197. For an excellent historical perspective on this legislation to control interstate 
transportation of women for illicit purposes, see generally DAVID J. LANGUM, CROSSING 
OVER THE LINE: LEGISLATING MORALITY AND THE MANN ACT (1994). 
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courtrooms, and harsh prison treatment, and that they were 
overrepresented in crime statistics for reasons that demanded inquiry.  
The Harvard law professor Zechariah Chafee, Jr., wrote to Wickersham, 
“My indebtedness to some members of that race has been so great that I 
should be very sorry indeed not to have the Commission pay adequate 
attention to their problems and the injustices which they have suffered 
in connection with the enforcement of the law.”198  Federal Judge Joseph 
C. Hutcheson, Jr., of Houston, Texas, believed that a study of crime, 
criminal justice, and conditions of blacks in the South could be 
conducted without serious negative political implications for the 
Commission.199  After consideration of possible black membership, 
Hoover decided against such an appointment on the basis of its violation 
of his principle of having no special interest representation.  Instead, he 
appointed a white woman, Ada L. Comstock, and a small number of 
women consultants to represent all groups other than white.200  Unlike 
Wilson, Harding, and Coolidge, there is no evidence Hoover 
disregarded the horrors of lynching and the plight of blacks in the 
criminal justice system.  But as Donald Lisio has remarked, Hoover’s 
dry, sterile utopianism presented an image to blacks of detachment and 
a somewhat naïve faith in the cooperative spirit between the races.201  In 
the campaign of 1928 both Hoover and Al Smith failed to take a 
position on racial violence.  Hoover was, however, a national politician 
who, like so many other progressive thinkers, feared backlash from 
southern members of Congress.  The contradiction in all of this, 
however, was that Hoover appointed black representatives to the 
Haitian study commission.202  Ironically, the black educators on that 
 
198. Letter from Zechariah Chafee to George Wickersham (June 7, 1930) (on file at the 
National Archives and Records Administration at RG 10, Box 8).  Wickersham returned 
Chafee’s correspondence to say that the budget did not permit a special study of Negroes and 
criminal justice administration.   
199. Letter from Max Lowenthal to Newton D. Baker (Oct. 21, 1929) (on file at the 
National Archives and Records Administration at RG 10, Box 4). 
200. Some exceptionally important correspondence on the matter of crimes in and 
affecting the black population in both rural and urban settings includes exchanges between 
Comstock and van Kleeck and Wickersham, examples of which include: Letter from Mary 
van Kleeck to George W. Wickersham (Feb. 19, 1930) (on file at the National Archives and 
Records Administration at RG 10); Letter from Walter White to Mary van Kleeck (Mar. 19, 
1930) (on file at the National Archives and Records Administration at RG 10, Box 10). 
201. DONALD J. LISIO, HOOVER, BLACKS, & LILY-WHITES: A STUDY OF SOUTHERN 
STRATEGIES 274–82 (1985). 
202. See HANS SCHMIDT, THE UNITED STATES OCCUPATION OF HAITI, 1915–1934, at 
185 (1971); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION FOR THE 
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commission were denied passage on Navy ships bound for Haiti, but 
were able to continue their work with private means of transportation.203  
Hoover’s minimal efforts at outreach, along with several other rather 
small initiatives and legislative proposals, added to the sharp decline in 
support he suffered during the 1932 campaign.204 
A second disappointment resulted from Hoover’s failure to declare 
what should or would be done with the Commission’s results.  There 
was, as we would say in modern times, no “exit strategy” toward either 
the continuation of research or affirmative commitments to ensure 
implementation at the federal level and to build a plan to encourage 
state and local progress.  In fact, Hoover’s 1932 campaign hardly 
referenced the work of the Commission and how the findings might 
have been folded into an action plan.  One was left to wonder: Was all 
the hard work intended as a searching examination for examination’s 
sake, or was it intended to find application in a second term in office?  
Did the narrowing of the brain–state gap have an ultimate action side, 
or was the Commission’s work limited to floating marvelous results and 
indicators of needed change?  Were the findings simply too 
overpowering in complexity and implications?  Was public education 
short-circuited and were further discussions blocked by the atmosphere 
of suddenness when the final reports were submitted and the 
Commission doors were closed?  Perhaps the defect in this area 
stemmed from Hoover’s failure to engage the public in the problems of 
justice system responses, that is, did the public have a stake in the results 
and, if so, could they see what that stake was? 
And, third, there were topics that were given no significant place, or 
no place at all, on the agenda of the Commission.  Indications from 
developments in criminology and in society, in my view, suggest that 
several important issues should not have been ignored.  First is the 
matter of crimes committed by businesses, corporations, and stock 
traders, and other persons in positions of economic power—in essence, 
the kinds of offenses that Edwin Sutherland later termed (and not much 
later) “white collar crimes.”205  Against the backdrop of the stock market 
crash in late 1929, ideas for research reports remained under 
 
STUDY AND REVIEW OF CONDITIONS IN THE REPUBLIC OF HAITI (1930). 
203. See SCHMIDT, supra note 202, at 185. 
204. CALDER, supra note 32, at 183–88. 
205. See Edwin H. Sutherland, Crime and Business, 217 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & 
SOC. SCI. 112, 112 (1941); Edwin H. Sutherland, Is “White Collar Crime” Crime?, 10 AM. SOC. 
REV. 132 (1945); Edwin H. Sutherland, White-Collar Criminality, 5 AM. SOC. REV. 1 (1940). 
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consideration well into 1930.  Legal and social science journals in the 
1920s had frequently explored such topics as embezzlement, stock fraud, 
insurance fraud, market rigging, faked market sales, and similar topics.206  
The Commission’s Report on the Cost of Crime was limited to estimating 
the costs to society without reference to perpetrators or victims of high 
stakes crime. 
Next, some but not much attention was given to illegal narcotics, 
despite the fact that a very significant percentage of the federal prison 
population was comprised of “drug pushers,” and the fact that Hoover 
and the Congress created the Bureau of Narcotics and Hoover 
appointed Harry J. Anslinger as its acting director in 1930.207  After the 
passage of the 1914 Harrison Narcotics Act,208 primarily a revenue law, 
federal authorities arrested thousands of doctors well into the 1930s who 
had illegally dispensed opiate and other regulated substances.209  The 
Advisory Committee on the Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous 
Drugs had been established by the first Assembly of the League of 
Nations on December 15, 1920, but the U.S. was not formally a member 
until 1933.210  From 1900 until the late 1920s, the United States had been 
actively but quietly working on the matter of the massive quantities of 
opiates illegally imported into the U.S. from China and Japan, and the 
Justice Department had engaged in several investigations of smugglers, 
including the gangster Arnold Rothstein.211  Meanwhile, as the social 
 
206. Selected scholarly articles from the times that demonstrate the rising interest in 
business crimes and corporate frauds include: Henry W. Edgerton, Corporate Criminal 
Responsibility, 36 YALE L.J. 827 (1926); William Byron Forbush, The National Honesty 
Bureau, 1 J. SOC. FORCES 127 (1922–1923); William D. Gordon, Irregular Practices in 
Building and Loan Associations, 125 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 49 (1926); H. J. 
Kenner, The Fight on Stock Swindlers, 125 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 54 (1926); 
Frederic P. Lee, Corporate Criminal Liability, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1928); Keyes Winter, 
Parasites of Finance, 224 N. AM. REV. 516 (1927). 
207. JOHN C. MCWILLIAMS, THE PROTECTORS: HARRY J. ANSLINGER AND THE 
FEDERAL BUREAU OF NARCOTICS, 1930–1962, at 13 (1990). 
208. Harrison Narcotics Tax Act of 1914, ch. 1, 38 Stat. 785, repealed by Comprehensive 
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 1101(b)(3)(A), 84 
Stat. 1236, 1292. 
209. EDWARD JAY EPSTEIN, AGENCY OF FEAR: OPIATES AND POLITICAL POWER IN 
AMERICA 104 (1977). 
210. See LEAGUE OF NATIONS UNION, SUMMARY OF THE WORK OF THE LEAGUE OF 
NATIONS: JANUARY 1920–MARCH 1922, at 27 (2nd ed. 1922); DOUGLAS VALENTINE, THE 
STRENGTH OF THE WOLF: THE SECRET HISTORY OF AMERICA’S WAR ON DRUGS 19 (2004). 
211. Two excellent references to the government’s work to investigate Rothstein are: 
LEO KATCHER, THE BIG BANKROLL: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF ARNOLD ROTHSTEIN 293–96 
(1994), and DAVID PIETRUSZA, ROTHSTEIN: THE LIFE, TIMES, AND MURDER OF THE 
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activist Ellen N. LaMotte consistently revealed in her books that the 
British and other governments had been active participants in the 
distribution of opium from the Far East.212 
And finally, Hoover’s separate committee on Recent Social Trends in 
the United States, also appointed in 1929, was not integrated to any 
degree with the matters of crime and justice administration, particularly 
in terms of how social trends bore on the increasing amount of crime 
since 1900.213  Interestingly, the reports of this body, the work of 
President Hoover’s Research Committee on Social Trends, a massive 
tome of 1568 pages, paid little attention to the Prohibition issue and 
contained only brief discussion of crime’s relevance among the other 
competently researched trends.  Hoover wrote the foreword to this 
work, a clear indication of his satisfaction with all of the results.  I 
hesitate to render too harsh a criticism here since the topic of 
Prohibition remained largely a congressional priority that had consumed 
twelve months’ time of the Wickersham Commission.  Moreover, in 
1929, the Congress was unlikely to have permitted a broad social science 
venture tying together discussions about economic, political, and social 
trends in relationship to crime.  I believe, however, that the Wickersham 
Commission and the Hoover administration could have greatly 
expedited exposure of crimes by elites and illegal narcotics peddling by 
several decades and thus broken ground in similar ways as the reports of 
the cost of crime and lawlessness in policing had accomplished. 
VIII. BACK TO THE FUTURE: COMMISSIONS AND COMMITTEES AFTER 
WICKERSHAM 
In the end, the most significant contributions of the Wickersham 
Commission were open, comprehensive, and courageous actions to 
forthrightly address a range of issues laying bare crime and justice 
conditions that for many years had stimulated a diverse and 
sophisticated body of research that called out for policy implementation.  
 
CRIMINAL GENIUS WHO FIXED THE 1919 WORLD SERIES 323 (2003). 
212. Ellen N. LaMotte wrote four books on this subject.  ELLEN N. LA MOTTE, THE 
ETHICS OF OPIUM (1924); ELLEN N. LAMOTTE, OPIUM AT GENEVA (1929); ELLEN N. LA 
MOTTE, THE OPIUM MONOPOLY (1920); ELLEN N. LAMOTTE, SNUFFS AND BUTTERS 
(1925). 
213. The committee that wrote this report was officially known as the President’s 
Research Committee on Social Trends.  See PRESIDENT’S RESEARCH COMM. ON SOC. 
TRENDS, RECENT SOCIAL TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES: REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S 
RESEARCH COMMITTEE ON SOCIAL TRENDS, at vi, xi (1933). 
11 CALDER (DO NOT DELETE) 6/23/2013  11:17 AM 
1096 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [96:1035 
Commission reports on lawlessness in law enforcement, on police, on 
prosecution, and on the courts, for example, suggested a critical need for 
cooperation among individuals and agencies.  The Report on the Cost of 
Crime introduced an actor—the private police—that had theretofore 
been unrecognized in the larger scheme of crime prevention or even 
lawlessness behind the corporate veil.  The theme of corrupting 
influences and the impact on the operations of government were 
explored in the reports on Prohibition Enforcement and Lawlessness in 
Law Enforcement.  Although unintended at the outset, the Prohibition 
reports, in addition, opened a national dialogue about the extent of 
government intrusion into private life and private vices thus ensuring 
that any future national policies on vice controls would attract attitudes 
that included toleration of nullification in a democratic society.  The 
Report on Criminal Statistics, and the heated controversy that preceded 
its publication, set the tone for centralizing and making uniform crime 
data and data collection methods while it stimulated a useful and 
decades-long argument among criminologists about the ongoing needs 
for diverse statistical compilations. 
In essence, the Wickersham Commission provided pathways toward 
new and significantly better analyses of the crime problem that, despite 
Hoover’s belief in technocratic solutions, were destined to expand and 
further diversify.  Indeed, the brain–state gap was significantly narrowed 
by the copious and detailed material in the reports.  The Depression 
decade, followed by years of war and postwar fatigue, took its toll on the 
national concern for doing much with the information gleaned from the 
reports.  Clearly, by 1950, urban crime, including juvenile delinquency 
and organized crime, reached deeply into the hallways of local, state, 
and national governments, thus suggesting that at least some of the 
findings of the Wickersham Commission were destined to reappear or 
beg for updating.  It was not that the reports contained no valuable 
information that could have been turned into programmatic initiatives; 
rather, it was that the information had reached well beyond the common 
person’s ability to think about the complexities of what they proposed at 
a time when bread on the table (and later national security) were more 
pressing objectives.  As one commentator said of the Recent Social 
Trends volumes, and in my view equally relevant to the Wickersham 
reports, “Studious statesmen, like Mr. Hoover, might be able to make 
something out of this huge mass of material, if they were so minded, but 
the ordinary working politician, like the conventional average citizen, 
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requires his food for thought predigested.”214 
In the succeeding decades, the topics of crime and the administration 
of justice retained a prominent place at federal and state levels, cutting 
across ideological and party lines.  Reports written by many groups gave 
minimal recognition to the Wickersham group.  Most such efforts failed 
to make sophisticated conceptual or substantive connections, however, 
between the earlier work and the then-current concerns.  The following 
is a brief summation of the committees, commissions, and conferences 
regarded as offspring of the Wickersham Commission: 
In June 1933, three months after Hoover’s relatively obscure and 
somewhat unpleasant departure from the presidency, the Senate passed 
Resolution 74 directing the Commerce Committee to conduct an 
investigation into crime and criminal practices.215  Not unexpectedly, 
President Roosevelt and Attorney General Homer S. Cummings needed 
their own venue on the matter of crime.  Cummings, therefore, formed a 
Conference on Crime held on December 10–13, 1934, in Washington, 
D.C.  Five hundred participants attended these sessions and President 
Franklin Roosevelt gave the opening speech to call attention to public 
activation of continued interest in America’s crime problems.  The 
conference resolved to establish a national institute for criminology to 
train police in crime detection techniques, great cooperation between all 
law enforcement organizations, condemnation of parole and probation 
abuses, improvements in criminal laws and procedures, condemnation of 
lynching and use of private police to suppress industrial conflicts, and 
creation of a permanent crime conference venue to meet every two 
years.216  Cummings used his position to deliver several speeches across 
the nation on crime and justice topics.  He was particularly instrumental 
in furthering the work of his predecessor, Attorney General Mitchell, in 
advancing procedural changes in the federal court system, expanding 
funding and reorganization measures in federal law enforcement, and 
securing passage of several key pieces of crime legislation.  The 
Conference proceedings were published in 1934.217  Noteworthy is the 
lineup of keynote speakers in addition to Cummings: President Franklin 
 
214. Arthur N. Holcombe, Report on Recent Social Trends in the United States, 27 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 222, 227 (1933). 
215. 77 CONG. REC. 5716–17 (1933) (statement of Sen. Royal Copeland); see also S. 
REP. NO. 75-1189 (1937).  Note that the report was published four years after the committee’s 
opening assignment. 
216. 8-Point Plan Urged to Wipe Out Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1934, at 1. 
217. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 196. 
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D. Roosevelt and Herbert Hoover’s Secretary of State, Henry L. 
Stimson.  From all appearances, it looked as if President Roosevelt’s 
address, and indeed the Attorney General’s conference, were 
intentionally organized to match Hoover’s and Wickersham’s leadership 
in crime control policy five years earlier. 
New York’s Governor Herbert Lehman followed suit in 1935 with a 
conference of experts from policing and other criminal justice areas, 
held over four days in Albany, New York, in late September and early 
October.  Proceedings of this conference included sections on crime 
prevention, detection and apprehension, prosecution and the court, 
institutional care, and probation, parole, and rehabilitation.  Only one 
cited reference was made in the New York proceedings to the 
Wickersham Commission’s reports, but at least a small number of 
experts in attendance included consultants who had worked on the 
Wickersham investigations.218  One of the most pronounced themes of 
this conference was the insistence on agency coordination and 
cooperation, a theme that was suggested by the disarray so evident in 
justice systems nationwide for several decades.  This was also a theme 
demonstrated time and again during Prohibition and one that persisted 
into the late 1980s with federal investigations of organized crime. 
Senator Robert M. LaFollette, Jr.’s, Subcommittee of the Senate 
Committee on Education and Labor gained national prominence 
between 1936 and 1939 when it exposed the surveillance, physical 
intimidation, and other techniques used by large employers to prevent 
workers from organizing labor unions.  The report, published in 1939, 
was particularly helpful in probing the amount of oppressive conduct—
including employers’ use of private police, who often employed abusive 
tactics.219  This work moved beyond the Wickersham Commission by 
joining the revelations about the amount of private policing explored in 
the Cost of Crime report with the ignored topic of private police abuses 
not explored in the Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement. 
Senator Harry Truman’s Special Committee to Investigate the 
National Defense Program began operations in 1941 to probe 
corruption in the war production effort.  Largely ignored by 
criminologists and many historians, this committee extended the 
Wickersham Commission’s concerns for the “Cost of Crime” in 
 
218. STATE OF N.Y., PROCEEDINGS OF THE GOVERNOR’S CONFERENCE ON CRIME, 
THE CRIMINAL AND SOCIETY 350 (1935). 
219. S. REP. NO. 76-6, pt. 2, at 1 (1939). 
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American society, although from an entirely opposing direction.  
Truman’s initiative in leading the committee served as a lightning rod 
for criminological studies of crimes and unethical practices occurring 
inside major American war production and support facilities,220 thus 
extending the Wickersham investigations into crime costs in the private 
sector.  Here was an investigation into the costs of crime to the 
taxpayers as a function of racketeering by overt or covert means by 
corporations and labor unions.221 
Organized crime had been discussed by some of the Wickersham 
Commission consultants in connection with the “Lawlessness” study and 
others, but the subject was never fully developed.  Juvenile and adult 
gangs had only recently come under academic scrutiny by criminologists 
and the Prohibition circumstances expanded their profile.  The 
investigation of Al Capone by the Hoover White House, the Justice 
Department, and the Bureau of Internal Revenue jettisoned studies of 
gangsters and their bases of economic and political power in urban 
areas.  Apart from the war industry investigations, with few exceptions 
the ongoing concerns for growing economic power of racketeers, in 
particular, were shelved during World War II.  Interest at the state and 
local levels returned, however, in the late 1940s.  California’s Governor 
Earl Warren established a Special Crime Study Commission (the 
Standley Commission) on Organized Crime in late 1947.  Between 1948 
and 1950, this group produced four reports that extended earlier work to 
focus on the sources of racketeering economic power, largely in 
gambling enterprises and their impact public corruption.222  Frank 
Loesch, the Wickersham commissioner most closely familiar with the 
circumstances of racketeering in the 1920s, had cautioned many times 
about the growing strength of organized criminal elements. 
President Harry Truman delivered the opening address to the 
Attorney General’s Conference on Organized Crime held in the Great 
Hall at the Department of Justice on February 15, 1950.  Following in 
the traditions of Herbert Hoover and Franklin Roosevelt to spur on the 
work of crime study groups and conferences, Truman called for 
improvements in law enforcement capabilities to deal with racketeering, 
 
220. Marshall B. Clinard, Criminological Theories of Violations of Wartime Regulations, 
11 AM. SOC. REV. 258, 258, 261 (1946). 
221. ALONZO L. HAMBY, MAN OF THE PEOPLE: A LIFE OF HARRY S. TRUMAN 251–53 
(1995). 
222. See STATE OF CAL., FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL CRIME STUDY COMMISSION 
ON ORGANIZED CRIME 11 (1953).  
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including emphasis on rooting out police corruption.223  In succeeding 
months Senator Estes Kefauver’s Special Committee to Investigate 
Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce was created in mid-1950 
following a special conference of experts held in Williamsburg, Virginia, 
in January of that year.  President Truman had addressed the earlier 
conference to call attention to the dramatic increase in racketeering.  
The Kefauver hearings began in 1951.  They drew wide public attention 
as racketeers were for the first time shown on national television.224 
From 1957 to 1960, Senator John McClellan’s hearings on labor 
racketeering developed out of the investigative work of the Select 
Committee on Improper Activities in Labor and Management.  This 
committee represented the largest government probe into organized 
crime, an indication of the expansion of racketeering well beyond what 
had been suggested in the Wickersham efforts.225  It would not be the 
final effort to investigate this major economic, political, and social 
problem for the remainder of the twentieth century. 
President Lyndon Johnson’s Commission on Law Enforcement and 
the Administration of Justice was commissioned in 1965 and ended its 
work in 1967.  This effort was the most directly linked to the design of 
the Wickersham Commission more than thirty-five years earlier.  The 
scope and depth of the work of this commission was significantly greater 
in many respects than the Wickersham group, and it represented the 
first occasion for the Executive Branch to return to broad national study 
efforts since 1929–1931.  A key contrast, as suggested by Professor 
Samuel Walker, was the extent to which Johnson’s commission moved 
well beyond mere study and revelations of crime and justice system 
problems to an expanded justification for progressively nationalizing 
crime control policies.226  The volumes of its work were carefully read 
 
223. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S CONFERENCE ON 
ORGANIZED CRIME (1950). 
224. See, e.g., Crime Report Ties O’Dwyer to Gangs, L.A. TIMES, May 2, 1951, at 1 
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See S. REP. NO. 81-2370 (1950) (first interim report); S. REP. NO. 82-141 (1951) (second 
interim report); S. REP. NO. 82-307 (1951) (third interim report); S. REP. NO. 82-725 (1951) 
(final report); see also 96 CONG. REC. 12,275 (1950); 97 CONG. REC. 1640 (1951); 97 CONG. 
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226. Samuel Walker, Reexamining the President’s Crime Commission: The Challenge of 
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and applied in the development of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act (1968), which Lyndon Johnson signed with some reluctance 
due to its electronic surveillance provisions.227 
Late in Lyndon Johnson’s second term tensions produced by the war 
in Vietnam combined with the spring 1968 assassinations of Martin 
Luther King and Robert F. Kennedy.  Significant racial discord in 
several large urban areas lay in the background context and atmosphere 
of violence.  Conditions of war protests, summer heat, and grinding 
poverty mixed with unaddressed discrimination and racial tensions 
leading ultimately to the Los Angeles Watts riot in 1965, the Detroit riot 
in 1967, and the Washington, D.C. riot in 1968.  In July 1967, following 
riots in Newark, NJ and Detroit, MI, President Johnson named the 
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (Kerner 
Commission), and one year later in July 1968, in the wake of the King 
and Kennedy assassinations, he named the National Commission on the 
Causes and Prevention of Violence (Eisenhower Commission).228  
Although these Commissions were not direct descendants of the 
Wickersham Commission, it is reasonable to observe that their origins in 
the socio-economic conditions and crime in black communities 
harkened back to the lack of black representation on the Wickersham 
Commission that could have addressed such matters in the 1929–1931 
study agenda.  Clearly, the nation could have advanced aggressive 
consideration of lynching and the economic and social ingredients of 
crime in minority areas if the Wickersham reports had tolerated at least 
 
organized crime, Professor Dwight Smith has argued that the Johnson Commission 
transformed the Wickersham Commission’s work as a study of a phenomenon to a modern 
focus since 1965 on names and specific criminal organizations.  See Dwight C. Smith, Jr., 
Wickersham to Sutherland to Katzenbach: Evolving an “Official” Definition for Organized 
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(codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2520). 
228. Foreword to NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE 
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was appointed by executive order of President Johnson in July 1967, Exec. Order No. 11,365, 
32 Fed. Reg. 11,111 (July 29, 1967), and issued its report in March 1968, Michael H. Schill, 
Race, the Underclass, and Public Policy, 19 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 433, 433 n.1 (1994).  The 
Violence Commission “worked through the end of the Johnson administration, but its life was 
extended by President Nixon and it reported out in December 1969.  Its task force reports 
were titled: Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives; The Politics of 
Protest: Violent Aspects of Protest and Confrontation; Firearms and Violence in American 
Life; Assassination and Political Violence; Law and Order Reconsidered; Violence and the 
Media; and Crimes of Violence.”  
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one special study as part of the Report on the Causes of Crime. 
New York City’s Commission to Investigate Alleged Police 
Corruption was coined the Knapp Commission after its chairman, the 
federal Judge Whitman Knapp.  This commission investigated the rising 
and persistent tide of reports that many new police personnel were 
regularly receiving graft payments.  As it turned out, the problem of 
police corruption in New York ran much deeper than a few new police 
officers, and the experiences in that city were not unique to the New 
York Police Department among the growing collection of large urban 
departments.  Called together in 1970 by New York City’s Mayor John 
V. Lindsay, the Knapp commission once again took up one of the 
Wickersham Commission’s major topics, “Lawlessness in Law 
Enforcement.”229 
President Richard Nixon’s National Commission on Criminal Justice 
Standards and Goals230 was formed in 1971 to set out benchmark criteria 
for assessing organizations across all elements and all levels of the 
criminal justice system (that is, policing, courts, and corrections).  One 
can easily link the earlier work of the Wickersham reports on Police, the 
Courts and Criminal Procedure, and Prisons and Jails.  The language of 
these and other reports in the Wickersham series was replete with 
references to standards for the operations of these functions as 
important to the elevation of public support for law and its observance. 
The significant rise in crime from the 1950s through the 1970s 
spawned an ever-expanding private police market for protection 
services.  Following the Wickersham Commission, no detailed formal 
study had been undertaken of this development and its implications for 
American justice administration until the Department of Justice in the 
Nixon administration awarded a contract in 1970 to the RAND 
Corporation to study private police in the United States.231  With hardly 
 
229. See Michael F. Armstrong, Foreword to KNAPP COMM’N, REPORT ON POLICE 
CORRUPTION (1972); NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT, REPORT 
ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 1 (1931).  Judge Whitman Knapp was appointed 
by New York Mayor John V. Lindsay in mid-1970, held hearings in late 1971, and reported 
out the following year.  Armstrong, supra. 
230. See NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS & GOALS, 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1 (1973).  
Established by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, a division of the U.S. 
Department of Justice, during President Nixon’s first administration in 1971, the Commission 
produced a series of extensively detailed reports that attempted to provide standardized 
guidelines for the administration of justice agencies and citizen crime prevention initiatives. 
231. See generally JAMES S. KAKALIK & SORREL WILDHORN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
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any reference to the history of private policing, including no reference to 
the Wickersham Commission’s Report on the Cost of Crime, RAND’s 
five-volume reports provided a basic outline of the nature and extent of 
the private policing industry, its problems, its regulations, and how the 
law affects its operations.  It also evaluated the benefits, costs, and risks 
to society of private security with the purpose of proposing policies and 
legislation to improve regulatory controls.  Increasingly in the 1970s, 
government investigations of crime turned attention back on expanded 
citizen involvement.  This initiative was largely intended to recalibrate 
the relationship between government and citizen shares in the problem 
of crime.  Through the decades following the Wickersham Commission 
Report on the Cost of Crime, criminologists, econometricians, and 
victimologists have all contributed to an ever-expanding research 
literature on economic, political, and social costs of crime for 
communities, local and state governments, and individual citizens.232 
President Ronald Reagan’s administration returned to a focus on 
crime and criminal justice.  The emphasis, however, was shifted to 
special topics such as violence, organized crime, and pornography.  The 
task of organizing the commission on violent crime was assigned to 
 
PRIVATE POLICE IN THE UNITED STATES: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1971).  Five 
volumes were originally published under contract by RAND in 1971 and made available to 
the public the following year.  Id. at v–vi.  The reports were titled Private Police in the United 
States: Findings and Recommendations (vol. 1), The Private Police Industry: Its Nature and 
Extent (vol. 2), Current Regulation of Private Police: Regulatory Agency Experience and Views 
(vol. 3), The Law and Private Police (vol. 4), and Special-Purpose Public Police (vol. 5).  Id.  
These reports can be considered direct descendants of concerns raised by George 
Wickersham in 1929 when he observed the costs to business organizations of private police 
protection against crime. 
232. There is evidence that academic interest in estimating the costs of crime 
commenced in the early 1920s.  Interest in this topic advanced after President Johnson’s 
Commission reports were published but intensive research and writing the combined interests 
in criminal justice costs and in the impact on victims emerged in the 1970s.  For some 
examples of articles of an on-going and thriving interest in crime costs, see generally Mark A. 
Cohen et al., Studying the Costs of Crime Across Offender Trajectories, 9 CRIMINOLOGY. & 
PUB. POL’Y 279 (2010); Paul Dolan & Tessa Peasgood, Estimating the Economic and Social 
Costs of the Fear of Crime, 47 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY. 121 (2007); Robert G. Hann, Crime 
and the Cost of Crime: An Economic Approach, 9 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 12, 13 (1972); 
Elizabeth Moore & Michael Mills, The Neglected Victims and Unexamined Costs of White-
Collar Crime, 36 CRIME & DELINQ. 408 (1990); John K. Roman, How Do We Measure the 
Severity of Crimes?: New Estimates of the Cost of Criminal Victimization, in 17 MEASURING 
CRIME & CRIMINALITY 37, 38 (John MacDonald ed., 2011); Natalie Taylor & Pat Mayhew, 
Financial and Psychological Costs of Crime for Small Retail Businesses, TRENDS & ISSUES 
CRIME & CRIM. JUST., no. 229, June 2002, at 1.  It is also interesting to reflect on the fact that 
Wickersham Commissioner Frank J. Loesch discussed the direct and indirect costs of 
racketeering. 
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Reagan’s first Attorney General, William French Smith.233  The 
commission’s mission was narrow in scope and intended only to make 
recommendations to the Attorney General on ways that the federal 
government could combat violent crime, and to recommend changes in 
federal law and its enforcement, criminal procedure, issues of federalism 
in criminal justice, juvenile crime, and issues regarding victims of crime.  
While the focus on violent crime had become more common from the 
1960s forward, concerns for maintaining effective criminal procedures in 
the federal system of criminal justice represented a direct link back to 
the Wickersham Commission’s work. 
Reagan’s Commission on Organized Crime was formed in July 1983 
as a twenty-member panel to make a full analysis of national and 
regional circumstances associated with organized crime and to 
recommend any needed legislative initiatives to assist then-current law 
enforcement efforts.234  The Commission’s findings were largely 
summations of hearings conducted in various cities in the United States.  
Analyses of special problems were published in 1986, but their impact 
was minimal since they were largely based on what law enforcement 
functions in various regions already knew and merely passed on to the 
Commission on Organized Crime.  Clearly, organized crime had evolved 
by many degrees from the first minimal explorations by the Wickersham 
Commission.  Significant emphasis was given to drug trafficking, 
business and labor corruption, and financial institution compromise.  
Compared with the investigations done by the Task Force on Organized 
Crime, a subcomponent of Lyndon Johnson’s Commission on Law 
Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, the Reagan commission 
served as little more than a reminder that organized crime remained a 
menacing element that commanded financial and organizational power.  
Shades of the Wickersham Commission report on crimes of the foreign 
born were manifested in the Reagan commission hearings on the then-
current fears of Asian organized crime.  In this context, the Reagan-era 
investigations continued a traditional supply-side perspective that 
America’s problems with alcohol, drugs, corruption, gambling and other 
 
233. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT 
CRIME: FINAL REPORT (1981). 
234. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON ORGANIZED CRIME, THE IMPACT: ORGANIZED CRIME 
TODAY (1986).  This report consisted of several volumes on a wide range of topics such as 
money laundering, drugs and drug trafficking, business and labor union corruption, gambling, 
and the associated federal law enforcement challenges. 
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forms of vices were partly grounded in some foreign influence.235  
Reagan and his second Attorney General, Edwin Meese, were 
convinced that insufficient attention had been paid to the issue of 
pornography.  At nearly 2000 pages, the final report of the Attorney 
General’s Commission on Pornography attempted to document the 
social and interpersonal harms resulting from the dissemination of 
pornographic materials and it linked increasing spread of such material 
to organized crime groups.236 
IX. WRAPPING UP: HOOVER, BRAIN, STATE, AND WICKERSHAM 
As it turned out, President Hoover’s original high-minded vision for 
the Wickersham Commission had only a few months of much-heralded 
recognition before the economic bubble burst in the wake of the 
October 1929 stock market crash.  Thereafter, apart from everything 
else on the President’s plate, the struggle was to sustain enthusiasm for 
his ideas and the imagined contributions of the Commission.  As 
Hoover biographer George Nash has observed, the President remained 
an arguably reclusive captive of the White House from late 1931 
through the campaign of 1932.237  Close aides and friends who observed 
Hoover’s increasing unwillingness to communicate and to appear in 
public forums were told that the press of work in Washington was more 
important and demanding of his time.  In this respect he seemed to be 
his own worst enemy.  He seemed to be defeating himself, a sense that 
had also crept into the Roosevelt campaign strategy.238  Here was the 
engineer, the rational systems thinker and progeny of scientific 
 
235. For an example of an article from the early 1930s, see generally Constantine 
Panunzio, The Foreign Born and Prohibition, 163 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 147 
(1932).  
236. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY: 
FINAL REPORT, at v, 291, 303 (1986).  The work of this commission was intended to 
counterbalance opposite findings in the report commissioned by President Johnson in early 
1969, see Act of Oct. 3, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-100, 81 Stat. 253, but rejected by President Nixon 
later that year, see Statement About the Report of the Commission on Obscenity and 
Pornography, 1970 PUB. PAPERS 940, 940 (Oct. 24, 1970).  The Johnson-era report was then 
publicly released about one year later.  See generally COMM’N ON OBSCENITY & 
PORNOGRAPHY, THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY 
(1970). 
237. George H. Nash, Herbert Hoover’s 1932 Campaign, MILLER CENTER (Jan. 23, 
1992), http://www.millercenter.org/scripps/archive/forum/detail/717.  Dr. Nash, the official 
biographer of Herbert Hoover, delivered this lecture at the University of Virginia’s Miller 
Center. 
238. DAVID A. SHANNON, BETWEEN THE WARS: AMERICA, 1919–1941, at 144 (1965). 
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management, the philosophical leader of the associative state, the man 
who argued in 1928 and 1929 for fixing American criminal justice 
systems completely prostrate and out of touch save for a few special 
engagements.  At the time, people had no way of knowing that their 
highly popular candidate of 1928 was a man who disliked talking before 
large crowds, who despised the hypocrisies and silliness of Prohibition, 
who was grossly uncomfortable on the campaign trail, and who believed 
that people and systems (including the criminal justice system) would 
come to understand and therefore instantly fix the problems that had 
been identified by scientific study. 
Herbert Hoover was a lifelong student, and when he saw conditions 
and operations that needed fixing, he learned what he needed to know 
to fix them.  He knew how to organize people and processes to get 
things done.  Those characteristics were clearly evident in his work in 
China, his work in food relief, his work as Commerce Secretary, and his 
work to save thousands of lives during the Mississippi flood tragedy of 
1927.  As President, however, he failed to estimate the length of time 
that would be required to move past the tedium of the Prohibition issue.  
Even with the results of the Wickersham Commission in hand in 1931, 
he was incapable of transforming what he had called for into political 
messages in service of his own candidacy for a second term.  Simply put, 
his time on the particular task ran overtime, and he ran out of gas in his 
willingness to use what he learned to political advantage.  He ran out of 
interest in the centrality of criminal justice reforms, and the polity ran 
out of interest in the face of dire economic priorities. 
As applied to criminal justice matters, Hoover’s associative state 
envisioned a large amount of collaboration that was expected to run 
horizontally and vertically.  It expected local and state governments to 
take responsibility for law observance and enforcement, both 
symbolically and operationally.  It expected to have the voluntary and 
impassioned support of civic, business, legal, and labor organizations to 
aid in encouraging governments to find solutions to problems.  Intensely 
idealistic, Hoover believed strongly in a well-informed American public, 
but he was incapable by 1932 of going on the stump to lead in 
communicating the need to press on with the business of criminal justice 
reforms.  His faith in the Wickersham Commission as mainly a discovery 
and informational device was fundamentally correct in relationship to 
his own limited interests in resolving the Prohibition enforcement issue 
and in promoting support for the law until it was changed.  But he failed 
to understand that alcohol and its social and marketplace popularity 
were forces that voluntary associations and the law would never 
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successfully suppress.  By the time results appeared regarding the many 
other areas of discovery, he was too tired and distracted by economic 
and international issues to contribute much to the public’s need to learn 
more about the respective justice system problems.  Clearly, he would 
have objected to the conditions he must have observed by the mid-1940s 
that the federal government had moved rapidly into resolving the crime 
problem in ways that, in his time, were largely state actions.239 
The Wickersham Commission’s investigative efforts were purposely 
promoted to enlighten informed approaches to crime and justice.  They 
were pioneering efforts that attracted the intellectual and practical 
orientations of the leading scholars across the spectrum of emerging 
social and behavioral sciences.  By 1929 these new intellectual ventures 
had discovered the laboratories for testing their theories about human 
behavior in criminal conduct, police, courts, and jails and prisons.  They 
had settings in which they could gather data from captured subjects to 
develop testable hypotheses while they advanced hopeful ideas about 
controlling crime and improving the quality of social life.  They could 
inform the prospective actions of state governors, legislative bodies, and 
local government administrators. 
The entire activity of the Wickersham Commission from start to 
finish achieved one half of the brain–state relationship.  It taught the 
President what he needed to know, and to some extent it taught the 
public certain specifics about what had happened to American justice 
delivery.  It was less than successful in achieving the other half of the 
equation: the timely fulfillment of recommended changes in many but 
not all of the areas under study.  Lest I appear too harsh, Hoover’s 
fundamental approach to policy implementation was cautious and 
bottom-up; conditions of economy and social interest in justice system 
matters were upside down in 1932 versus 1929; Hoover was a tired and 
unwilling candidate for another four years in the White House; and the 
President was simply not the person to sell the product he so 
enthusiastically promoted for study.  The product itself—the collection 
of fourteen reports—is an example of what American scholars are 
capable of turning out when asked by a President to take a national or 
international problem seriously, to debate and find points of agreement, 
to focus on the realities of their recommendations, and to lay on the 
President’s desk a body of information useful over time in improving the 
 
239. See David Fellman, Some Consequences of Increased Federal Activity in Law 
Enforcement, 35 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 16 (1945). 
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quality of American life.  We have witnessed some failures in the 
commission study process and we have experienced some mediocre 
study processes and reports.  But we have also benefited from 
precedent-setting works like the Wickersham Commission produced in 
the amount of time it had to achieve its objectives.  As C.H. Willard, the 
Commission’s research director, observed in June 1929, “In dealing with 
the social disease called crime the country is now at the stage at which 
England found itself a hundred and fifty years ago when public 
sanitation in towns was born, first as a groping idea, and later maturing 
into a science.”240  Willard believed that the Commission could 
accomplish three objectives: it could assemble and judge the existing 
facts; it could educate the public with respect to the facts; and it could 
“help make possible the future program for getting facts and applying 
the treatment which can be deduced from such new facts.”241 
 
240. CALDER, supra note 32, at 216. 
241. Letter from Charles H. Willard to file (June 10, 1929) (on file at the National 
Archives and Records Administration at RG 10, Box 20).  Willard served as Max Lowenthal’s 
assistant. 
